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1. Introduction 
Exchange-rate flexibility, it has been argued, is useful because it facilitates 
relative  price  adjustment  among  countries.  Currency  depreciation  is  a 
quick and painless way to lower domestic prices relative to foreign prices. 
Much  attention  has  been  paid  recently  to the benefits  of exchange-rate 
stability in emerging economies.  That literature has focused on the poten- 
tial  for  greater  monetary  and  financial  stability  from  either  fixing  ex- 
change  rates  or  taking  more  extreme  measures  such  as  adopting  a 
currency board or dollarizing.  But that analysis is not directly applicable 
to the choices  facing many  advanced  countries-such  as the decision  to 
adopt  the euro for some  European countries.  These countries uniformly 
have  stable monetary  policies  (at least as stable as the policy  conducted 
by  the European Central Bank) and have  deep,  well-regulated  financial 
markets. The economic  benefit of adopting  the euro lies in the increased 
efficiency  of transactions  and  the elimination  of uninsurable  exchange- 
rate risk. On the other hand, a country adopting  the euro cedes its mone- 
tary policy  to the European Central Bank, and no longer has the option 
of  using  monetary  policy  to  respond  to  local  conditions.  Furthermore, 
adopting  the euro eliminates one possible avenue for adjustment between 
countries-the  relative  price  changes  induced  by  exchange-rate  move- 
ments.  It is this latter effect that is the focus  of this study. 
Recent evidence  has found  that consumer  prices in rich countries  are 
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not much  affected by nominal  exchange-rate  changes  in the short run.1 
This finding may imply  that nominal-exchange-rate  changes  do not play 
much  of a role in changing  relative prices of goods.  If consumer  prices 
are not  responsive  to exchange  rates, then  a depreciation  of  the home 
currency, for example,  does  not increase much the price that consumers 
pay for imported  goods.  However,  there are other interpretations of the 
evidence  on  exchange  rates  and  consumer  prices.  For example,  there 
might be important relative price effects but not for final consumer goods. 
One  possibility  is  that intermediate  firms  substitute  between  domestic 
and foreign goods  according  to relative price changes, but set prices for 
consumers  in a way  that is unresponsive  to exchange-rate  changes. 
The extent to which  exchange rates alter relative prices may be impor- 
tant for determining  the  desirability  of exchange-rate  flexibility  among 
advanced  nations.  Milton Friedman (1953), an early advocate  of flexible 
exchange  rates, argued  that one  advantage  of floating  rates is that they 
could  allow  rapid change  in relative prices between  countries  (p. 162): 
A rise in the exchange  rate...  makes  foreign  goods cheaper  in terms  of domes- 
tic currency,  even though their prices are unchanged in terms of their own 
currency,  and domestic goods more expensive in terms of foreign currency, 
even though their prices are unchanged in terms of domestic currency.  This 
tends to increase  imports [and] reduce exports. 
This passage makes two assumptions: that goods prices are unchanged 
in the currency of the producer of the good,  and that there is significant 
passthrough  of the exchange-rate  change  to the buyer  of the good.  On 
the nominal-price stickiness, Friedman argues that the choice of exchange- 
rate regime would  matter little if nominal  goods  prices adjusted quickly 
to shocks  (p. 165): 
If internal prices were  as flexible as exchange  rates, it would  make little eco- 
nomic  difference whether  adjustments were brought  about by changes  in ex- 
change rates or by equivalent  changes  in internal prices. But this condition  is 
clearly not fulfilled....  At least in the modem  world, internal prices are highly 
inflexible. 
In assessing  this  relative-price  effect  and  its  significance  for the choice 
of exchange-rate  regime,  Friedman is certainly correct to emphasize  the 
1. I have been the perpetrator  of some of this literature:  for example,  Engel  (1993,  1999)  and 
Engel  and Rogers  (1996,  2001).  Other  works include Rogers  and Jenkins  (1995),  Obstfeld 
and Taylor  (1997),  Parsley  and Wei (2001a,  2001b),  and Crucini,  Telmer,  and Zachariadis 
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importance of nominal-goods-price  stickiness. As Buiter (1999) has force- 
fully emphasized,  the decision  to join a monetary union,  or the choice of 
an exchange-rate  regime,  is a monetary  issue.  Relative-price behavior  is 
usually independent  of monetary regime in a world of perfect goods-price 
flexibility.  The choice  of monetary  regime  in this case  only  matters for 
short-run adjustment problems-the  period during which nominal prices 
are adjusting. 
The pioneering  work  of Obstfeld  and  Rogoff  (1995, 1998, 2000a) has 
assumed  that nominal  prices  are fixed  in the producers'  currencies,  so 
that prices for consumers change one for one in the short run with changes 
in the nominal exchange rate. This is exactly the assumption  of Friedman. 
I shall  call  this  the  PCP (for "producer-currency  pricing")  model.  The 
Obstfeld-Rogoff  (hereinafter, OR) models  offer a sound  analytical foun- 
dation  for the claim that flexibility  of exchange  rates is desirable in this 
setting.2 They derive three important results: (1) Exchange-rate flexibility 
achieves  relative-price  adjustment  under  PCP pricing.  Indeed,  in  their 
models,  flexible exchange  rates are a perfect substitute for flexible nomi- 
nal prices. That is, the flexible nominal-price allocations are achieved with 
PCP pricing but flexible exchange  rates. (2) The policy  that achieves  the 
flexible price allocation  is a constrained  Pareto optimum.  The monetary 
authorities  can do  no  better. (3) This optimal  policy  is completely  self- 
oriented.  No  policy  coordination  across  countries  is  required  or desir- 
able. In this sense,  perfectly  flexible exchange  rates are optimal. 
The key role of nominal-exchange-rate  flexibility in these models is that 
it allows  for expenditure  switching. That is, in the presence  of real shocks 
that are specific to one country (productivity  shocks, labor supply  shocks, 
government  spending  shocks, etc.), nominal-exchange-rate  changes allow 
adjustment of relative prices of goods  across countries. These changes  in 
relative  prices  can replicate  the changes  in relative  prices  that occur in 
flexible-price  economies.  For example,  a country that experiences  a pro- 
ductivity  increase should  experience  a decline  in the price of its output 
that induces a switch in expenditures  toward the domestic product. In the 
PCP framework, even though nominal prices are sticky in the producers' 
currencies,  this  relative-price  decline  can be  accomplished  by  nominal 
currency depreciation. 
A  number  of  recent papers  [Betts and  Devereux  (1996, 2000), Chari, 
Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000), and others] have examined  OR-style mod- 
els in which nominal prices are set in advance in the currency of consum- 
ers. In that case, nominal-exchange-rate  changes  do not, in the short run, 
change any prices-nominal  or real-faced  by consumers. I shall call this 
2. See Lane (2001) for an excellent  general survey  of the work stimulated  by OR. 234  ENGEL 
the LCP (for "local-currency pricing") model. Devereux  and Engel (2001) 
have examined  monetary policy  in this setting, and have concluded  that 
there is no case for nominal-exchange-rate  flexibility-indeed,  fixed ex- 
change  rates are preferred. 
The size  of  the  expenditure-switching  effect  is important  in interna- 
tional macroeconomics  not only for how it might influence optimal mone- 
tary policy. The literature, dating back to Mundell (1968) and earlier,3  has 
emphasized  the  expenditure-switching  role  of  nominal-exchange-rate 
changes in transmitting business-cycle  fluctuations between  countries. On 
the other hand, Krugman (1989) has argued  that nominal-exchange-rate 
volatility  might  be  accentuated  if  the  expenditure-switching  effect  is 
small. The smaller the effect of exchange-rate changes  on relative prices, 
and hence on relative demands,  the larger the exchange-rate change that 
is required to reach equilibrium.4 
Sections 2, 3, 4, and 5 of this paper lay out the framework of the new 
open-economy  macroeconomics.  I discuss  why  floating  exchange  rates 
are desirable under PCP, but fixed exchange rates may be optimal under 
LCP. Empirical evidence  supports  the notion  that consumer  prices  are 
not very  responsive  in the short run to nominal-exchange-rate  changes. 
Section 6 reviews  some  of that empirical evidence,  and adds  some  new 
supporting  evidence. 
But the apparent small response  of consumer  prices to exchange-rate 
changes  in the short run does  not necessarily  imply  that nominal  prices 
are sticky in consumers'  currencies, or that the expenditure-switching  ef- 
fect is  small.  In OR (2000b), transportation  costs  and  distribution  costs 
increase the cost of imported  goods,  and serve to segment  national mar- 
kets. Even if imported  goods  are nearly perfect substitutes  for domesti- 
cally  produced  goods,  they  may  not  be  consumed  in  great  quantity 
because  their cost  is higher.  In that case,  an exchange-rate  change  will 
have  only  a small effect on the consumer  price index. 
A  related  approach  observes  that the  actual physical  good  is only  a 
small  part of what  the consumer  buys.  The consumer  also pays  for the 
nontraded  marketing,  distribution,  and retailing  services  that bring the 
good  to  the  buyer.  Perhaps  these  costs  are quite  large,  and  dominate 
the cost of the physical good. If so, the influence of exchange-rate changes 
on real allocations  is likely  to be small,  since  the exchange-rate  change 
only  affects a small part of the cost of the good  cum  service purchased 
by the consumer.  This is the approach taken by McCallum and Nelson 
(2000). 
3. See Obstfeld  (2001) for a survey  of pre-Mundellian  literature. 
4. Devereux  and  Engel  (2002) explore  this  argument  and  its limitations  in the context  of 
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In both of these models,  nominal  consumer  prices of imported  goods 
are not sticky. But some new evidence  will be presented in Sections 7 and 
8 that suggests  these models  are, at best, only a small part of the explana- 
tion for the lack of responsiveness  of consumer  prices  to exchange-rate 
changes.  It seems  likely  that  there  is  a significant  degree  of  nominal- 
consumer-price  stickiness.  However,  sticky  consumer  prices  in  them- 
selves  do  not  necessarily  rule  out  an  important  expenditure-switching 
effect. 
Obstfeld (2001) and Devereux,  Engel, and Tille (1999) model  imported 
goods  as  intermediates  in  the  production  of  final  consumer  goods.  In 
Obstfeld, there are domestic substitutes for the import, while in Devereux, 
Engel, and Tille there are not. When  there are substitutes,  the importer 
might  switch  between  the  imported  intermediate  and  the  locally  pro- 
duced  alternative when  the exchange  rate changes.  Obstfeld  argues that 
in this type  of economy,  there may indeed  be a significant  expenditure- 
switching  effect.  It is not  consumers  who  switch  between  imports  and 
locally  produced  goods,  but rather local producers  who  combine  inter- 
mediate  goods  to make the final consumer  product. It is both the degree 
of  passthrough  and  the  amount  of  substitutability  that  determine  the 
strength  of  the  expenditure-switching  effect.  Section  9  explores  these 
models,  and Section 10 sets out some  directions  for future research. 
2. Models  of Exchange  Rates  and Relative  Prices 
In this  and  the next  three  sections,  I examine  some  simple  new-open- 
economy  macroeconomic  models.  These models  are fully integrated equi- 
librium models  in which households  and firms make optimal choices, but 
in which  some  nominal  prices are not completely  responsive  to shocks. 
There are two countries in the general model.  I will  assume  that there 
is  a single  period,  though  most  of the results  I discuss  carry over  to a 
multiperiod  framework. I assume  households  in the home  country max- 
imize 
U =1  Cl  P+X  ln(-P)- 
M  L. 
C is a consumption  aggregate.  Households  consume  goods  produced  in 
the  home  country  and  in  the  foreign  country.  Assume  preferences  are 
homothetic  (so consumption  aggregates  and price indexes  are defined.) 
Real balances, MD/P,  appear in the utility function, where P is the opti- 
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Foreign households  are assumed  to have  similar utility functions: 
1  / AMD* 
U  =  C1-  P +  x ln(  Ip  -  L*. 
Starred (*) variables  are the  foreign  counterparts  to  the  home-country 
variables. 
Money  is supplied  exogenously  through  transfers. In equilibrium  we 
have money  supply  equals money  demand  in each country M =  MD and 
M* =  MD*.  The money  supplies  are random  (as are productivity  shocks 
to be introduced  shortly.) 
I will assume there are financial markets of the type discussed  in Dever- 
eux and Engel (2001). Specifically, there are nominal bonds,  traded prior 
to the realization  of the state, that have payoffs  specific to each possible 
state of the world. Most of the models we consider have home and foreign 
consumers facing different prices for the same good on spot markets. That 
is, the markets are segmented.  We assume  that it is impossible  to make 
state-contingent trades that allow payoffs in physical goods, as that would 
allow  households  to get around paying  the price set in their market. In- 
stead, payoffs  are specified  in nominal  terms. Optimal  contracts ensure 
that the marginal  utility  from an additional  unit of currency is propor- 
tional between  home  and foreign consumers  in all states  (where  I have 
assumed  the constant of proportionality  is 1): 
C-P  C*- P 
P  SP 
S is the nominal  exchange  rate, expressed  as the home-currency  price of 
foreign currency. 
Even though there is a nominal bond traded for each state of the world, 
markets are not complete, because  the goods  markets are segmented  na- 
tionally.  If the same good  sells  for different prices in different markets, 
households  cannot arbitrage the goods  market. As a result, risk sharing 
is not perfect unless  purchasing-power  parity (PPP) holds  (P =  SP*). 
The assumption  that so many  nominal  assets are traded is, of course, 
unrealistic. It is a useful  benchmark, and here it allows  us to arrive at a 
simple  flexible model  that can be used  to analyze relative-price effects in 
general  equilibrium.  We can reproduce  Friedman's claim that nominal- 
exchange-rate flexibility allows desirable relative price adjustments to oc- 
cur rapidly  under his assumption  of nominal  prices fixed in producer's 
currencies, but we  can also analyze  other assumptions  about how  prices 
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The following  equilibrium conditions  emerge using the first-order con- 
ditions  for the household  optimization  problem: 
M  =  XPCP,  M* =  xP*C*P, 
W =  VPCP,  W  =  -vP*C*P. 
Here, W and  W* are the home  and foreign wage,  respectively. 
This framework, while making very specific assumptions  about prefer- 
ences, has the advantage  that it is easy to analyze  under a variety of as- 
sumptions  about  goods  pricing  and  about  preferences  over  goods.  We 
can derive a solution  for the nominal exchange rate that does not depend 
on any assumptions  about the production  side  of the economy  or about 
how  nominal  prices  are set,  without  making  any  further assumptions 
about consumption  utility: 
M* 
Now  we  turn to the production  side of the economy.  There are a large 
number  of goods  produced  in each country,  each by  a monopolist.  We 
will initially consider models  in which output for each firm i is produced 
using only a labor input: Yi = rlLi  and Y* = r*L*.5  Here  l (rq*)  is a produc- 
tivity shock that is common  to all home  (foreign) firms. We will consider 
a variety  of possible  assumptions  about how  prices  are set. Prices may 
be flexible-that  is, set with  full information  about the state. Or, in the 
new  open-economy  models,  firms must  set nominal  prices in some  cur- 
rency prior to knowledge  about the state. 
3. Flexible  Nominal  Prices 
It is helpful  first to examine  some  of the properties  of this model  under 
completely  flexible  nominal  prices. We shall  assume  home  and  foreign 
households  have identical CES preferences over home and foreign aggre- 
gates. Each of these aggregates  is in turn a CES function over the individ- 
ual goods  produced  in the home  and the foreign  country,  respectively. 
Firms face constant-elasticity  demand  curves, and therefore set prices as 
a constant markup over unit costs. We allow firms to discriminate across 
home and foreign markets. But under our assumptions  about preferences 
5. One of the models  we examine later will have an iceberg transportation cost for shipping 
goods  overseas.  We will  also consider  models  in which  intermediate  goods  are used  as 
inputs  into final-goods  production. 238  ENGEL 
and about financial markets,  when PPP holds (under flexible prices or 
under  PCP),  firms  choose the same price for  home and foreign  consumers. 
Aggregating across all home firms, we get 
PH =  MW/q1, 
where PH  is the home currency  price of home goods, and g >  1 is the 
markup.  We have also PH  = SPH,  where PH  is the foreign-currency  price 
of home goods. Likewise, 
PF =  lW*/fl*, 
and PF =  SPF. 
We can also derive these equations for nominal wages in equilibrium: 
W= VM,  W*  =  iM*. 
x  x 
It follows from the equilibrium  conditions that 
PH -  PH_ 
PF  PF  Ti 
The relative price of home goods falls when there is an increase in q. 
When productivity in home firms increases, the cost per unit of home 
goods declines. Those costs savings are passed on to consumers in the 
form of lower prices. 
I will not undertake  a formal  welfare analysis of the models presented 
here. Instead,  I will focus on what turns out to be a critical  aspect of the 
welfare analysis:  the extent to which an exchange-rate  regime  is beneficial 
in achieving  the adjustment  of the price of home goods relative  to foreign 
goods. Under the Friedman  framework,  exchange-rate  flexibility allows 
immediate adjustment  of that relative price in response to real shocks. 
But, as we shall see, that finding is a special case that depends critically 
on how Friedman  assumes nominal goods prices are set. 
4.  Sticky Nominal Prices: PCP Case 
Now consider  the model when firms  must set nominal  prices in advance. 
In the one-period framework  here, this means that prices are set in ad- 
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tions. Perhaps there are menu costs or some other sorts of costs that make 
it more  profitable  to  set  a non-state-contingent  nominal  price. First we 
take up the case in which  firms set prices in their own  currencies. That 
is, home  firms set prices in the home  currency, whether  for sale to home 
or foreign  households.  We call this the PCP case. The law  of one  price 
holds  for goods  sold at home  and in the foreign country, because,  as we 
noted above, under our assumptions  about preferences and financial mar- 
kets, firms do not price-discriminate. 
It follows  that 
PH  PH _  PH 
PF  PF  SPF 
Under the PCP assumption,  both PH  and PF are fixed ex ante and do not 
respond  to shocks  to demand  or money  supply.  Define  K -  PH/P.  Be- 
cause  these  nominal  prices  are set  in advance  of the realization  of  the 
state, K does not depend  on the outcomes  of the random variables. Then 
the relative price of home  to foreign goods  varies inversely  with  the ex- 
change  rate: 
PH  K 
PF  S 
Substituting  in the expression  for the equilibrium  exchange  rate, we  get, 
under PCP pricing, 
PH  M* 
PF  M 
Here we  can see the gist of Friedman's argument for flexible exchange 
rates. If the exchange rate were fixed, there would  be no channel to trans- 
late real demand  shocks  into  a relative-price  change.  That is, if the ex- 
change rate were held constant at a value  of S, the relative price of home 
to foreign goods  would  not depend  on the shocks that hit the economy: 
PH  K 
PF  S' 
But with  exchange-rate  flexibility  and  the  correct monetary  policy,  the 
real productivity  shocks can be translated precisely into the same relative- 
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rules M =  (Xrl  /  V)PH and M* =  (X */A\1)PF, the relative price will equal 
exactly its value under flexible prices: 
PH  _  P  _ 
* 
PF  PF  11 
In fact, allocations are identical under PCP with these monetary rules, 
and under flexible prices. That is very much in accord with Friedman's 
intuition:  flexible  exchange  rates  are a perfect  substitute  for flexible  goods 
prices in the presence of real shocks. 
Moreover,  in the models of OR (1998, 2000a), mimicking the flexible 
price allocation is  the constrained globally efficient monetary policy. 
While the flexible-price  equilibrium  itself is not Pareto-efficient  (because 
of the monopoly distortions),  optimal monetary policy can do no better 
than to replicate  the flexible-price  allocation. 
The monetary  policy I set out above is not only the policy that would 
be set by a global central  planner.  It is, as OR (2000a)  show, the policy that 
self-interested  national  economic  planners  would follow. That  is, there is 
no gain to international  monetary  coordination.  Central  banks following 
policies that maximize their own country's  welfare can achieve the con- 
strained  globally  efficient  outcome.  Thus,  a system in which central  bank- 
ers do not cooperate at all and allow the exchange rate to float freely is 
optimal, as Friedman  claimed.6 
This model, however, has implications that seem counterfactual:  that 
exchange-rate  changes are passed through one for one into consumer 
prices,  and that  the law of one price  holds for all goods. It is this character- 
istic of the model that has led some researchers  to consider the local- 
currency  pricing version of the sticky-nominal-price  model. 
5. Sticky  Prices:  LCP  Case 
An alternative  model for price setting is that firms set prices in the cur- 
rency of consumers  of the product.  That  is, when a home firm sells in the 
home market, it sets prices in the home currency,  but for sales to the 
foreign market  it sets prices in the foreign currency.  We call this the LCP 
(for "local-currency  pricing")  case. 
It follows immediately  in this case that a flexible  nominal  exchange  rate 
cannot achieve the optimal relative-price  adjustment.  Ph and Pf are both 
6. OR (1998, 2000a) have  delicate sets of assumptions  on preferences  and market structure 
that ensure that markets are actually complete.  But OR (2001) show  that these basic con- 
clusions  are, to first order, robust to market incompleteness. Expenditure  Switching  and Exchange-Rate  Policy  *  241 
set  in  the  domestic  currency  and  do  not  respond  to  contemporaneous 
shocks. We cannot replicate the flexible-price solution  PH/PF =  PH/PF = 
TI*/TI with  flexible exchange  rates, no matter what  the monetary  policy. 
In fact, Devereux  and Engel (2001) go  further and demonstrate  that the 
optimal  monetary  policy  in this case delivers  fixed  exchange  rates.7 Or, 
put  another way,  if the foreign  country  is following  optimal  monetary 
policy  while  the home  country  is using  the exchange  rate as its policy 
instrument,  the optimal  exchange-rate policy  is to fix. 
There is a simple way  to understand  the striking difference in optimal 
policy in the PCP world vs. the LCP world. There are two types of devia- 
tions from efficiency which  monetary policy might be able to rectify in a 
sticky-price  world.  One is that relative  prices might  not respond  in the 
correct  way  to  real  shocks,  so  that  we  might  not  achieve  PH/PF = 
PH/PF  =  rl*/T. In the absence of optimal relative-price changes, consum- 
ers do not receive  the correct signals  and do not alter their demand  for 
goods  in the appropriate  way  when  real shocks  hit. As  a consequence, 
resources will  not be allocated  efficiently. 
The other type of inefficiency comes because deviations  from PPP lead 
to incomplete  risk sharing. As noted above, with a complete  set of nomi- 
nal  contingent  claims  traded,  in  equilibrium  C-P/P  =  C*-P/SP*. Asset 
markets do not deliver complete risk sharing unless PPP holds  (P = SP*). 
When prices are set in producers' currencies (PCP), PPP does  hold, so 
asset  markets  do  deliver  complete  risk sharing.  In that case,  monetary 
policy  can be devoted  entirely to ensuring  that relative prices respond in 
the appropriate way to real shocks. But, of course, exchange-rate flexibil- 
ity is needed  to deliver  the relative-price response. 
Under  local-currency  pricing, relative prices simply  cannot change  in 
the short run in response  to real shocks. It is useless  for monetary-policy 
makers  to  devote  any  effort to  achieving  an  efficient  relative-price  re- 
sponse.  But, under  LCP pricing, both  P and P* are predetermined  and 
not affected by real shocks. If the nominal  exchange  rate is fixed so that 
PPP holds  (S  =  P/P*),  then  asset  markets  will  achieve  complete  risk 
sharing. 
This model  is designed  to highlight  the role of expenditure  switching 
and deviations  from the law of one price for determining  optimal mone- 
tary policy. The conclusion  that fixed exchange rates are optimal, though, 
arises from some  special features of the model: identical preferences,  all 
goods  traded, and a nominal state-contingent  bond traded for every state 
7. Bacchetta and  van  Wincoop  (2000) and  Devereux  and  Engel  (1998) also  examine  ex- 
change-rate rules with  local-currency pricing.  However,  those  analyses  do not examine 
the real shocks  that are at the heart of the issues  we  discuss  here. 242  ENGEL 
of the world.  Under these assumptions,  it is optimal to target world  out- 
put and, with  fixed exchange  rates, allow  financial markets to share the 
risk that arises from idiosyncratic  shocks. 
More  generally,  there  might  be  a trade-off  between  the  objective  of 
monetary independence  and that of minimizing  deviations  from the law 
of one price. Suppose that in each economy  there is a sector that produces 
nontraded  goods,  and there are productivity  shocks  arising in the non- 
traded  sector. On the one  hand,  it might  be desirable  to use  monetary 
policy in this case to target local shocks. But such independent  monetary 
policy  will  lead to nominal-exchange-rate  changes  that imply  deviations 
from the law  of one price for traded goods.  These deviations  would  in- 
duce idiosyncratic  risk in traded goods  consumption. 
Corsetti and Pesenti  (2001) develop  a model  of "partial" passthrough 
of  exchange  rates  to  final  consumer  prices.  Ex  ante,  firms  may  pass 
through  only  a fraction X (taken to be exogenous)  of any exchange-rate 
change to consumer prices. The PCP model is one extreme, in which  X = 
1, and the LCP is the other extreme, in which X = 0. They examine optimal 
monetary  policy  and  the  optimal  degree  of exchange-rate  flexibility  in 
this framework. Since Corsetti and Pesenti assume goods are sold directly 
to consumers  (as do OR, and Devereux  and Engel), it seems  as though 
the empirically  relevant  case is the one  in which  X is nearly zero, since 
passthrough  to consumer  prices is very small in the short run. 
Corsetti and Pesenti show in their model that optimal policy minimizes 
a function of the output gap and deviations  from the law of one price. The 
output gap is "the distance between  actual and equilibrium employment 
levels."  It is not  always  the case that eliminating  the output  gap is the 
optimal  feasible  policy.  Corsetti  and  Pesenti's  theorem  implies  that 
policymakers can improve welfare by using monetary policy to help elim- 
inate  deviations  from the law  of one  price. Sometimes  there is  tension 
between  that goal and the goal of eliminating  the output  gap. 
6.  Empirical  Evidence  on Deviations  from the Law of 
One Price 
The PCP model and the LCP model differ clearly in one empirical predic- 
tion. The PCP model predicts that the law of one price holds for consumer 
goods,  while  the LCP model  predicts that it fails. Under the LCP model 
the (log) price of good  i in the home country relative to the foreign coun- 
try, pi -  s -  p*, varies as the nominal exchange rate changes, while in the 
PCP model  this  relative  price  is  unaffected  by  nominal-exchange-rate 
movements. 
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subsequent  sections)  fails  for traded-goods  prices  is  a well-established 
empirical  fact.  [See,  for  example,  Isard  (1977)  and  Kravis  and  Lipsey 
(1978). The recent pricing-to-market literature, surveyed by Goldberg and 
Knetter (1997), has documented  the lack of full response  of import prices 
to exchange-rate  changes.]  This literature has focused  on import and ex- 
port prices, not on the price of consumer goods. That distinction is impor- 
tant, as will  become  apparent in subsequent  sections  of this paper. 
Some  more  recent work  has  focused  on the failure of LOOP for con- 
sumer  goods.  That literature has documented  not only  that LOOP fails, 
but that its failure is large. 
To say that the failure is "large" requires some  metric for judging  the 
size of the deviations  from LOOP. One approach, in Engel (1993), was to 
compare  the variance  of deviations  from LOOP [that is, Var(A(pi -  s - 
p*)), where  A is the time  difference]  with  the variance  of relative  price 
changes  between  goods  within  a single  country  [Var(A(pi -  pj)), where  i 
and j are different products].  The idea is to understand  what  causes  the 
observed  large movements  in real exchange rates between  industrialized 
nations.  One  possibility  is  that  real-exchange-rate  movements  are due 
largely  to  deviations  from LOOP. But there are major competing  theo- 
ries  that assume  LOOP holds  and  attribute real-exchange-rate  changes 
to  relative-price  changes  among  different  goods.  The  most  prominent 
of  those  theories  posits  that  the  real  exchange  rate  changes  between 
two  countries  as  the  price  of  nontraded  goods  relative  to  traded 
goods  changes.  So,  if PN -  PT  rises  relative  to p~ -  PT  [home-country  (log) 
price  of nontraded  goods  relative  to traded  goods  rises  relative  to  the 
foreign-country  (log)  relative  price],  the  home-country  price  level  will 
rise relative  to the  foreign-country  level.  That is,  there will  be  a home 
real appreciation.  Another,  somewhat  less prominent  theory is that real 
exchange  rates fluctuate because  CPIs weight  goods  differently in differ- 
ent countries. Even if all goods  are traded and LOOP holds for all goods, 
real exchange rates fluctuate as relative prices change. For example, if the 
French weight  wine  heavily  in their CPI, then their CPI will rise relative 
to CPIs in other countries when  the price of wine  relative to other goods 
increases. 
Engel  (1993)  compares  Var(A(pi  -  s  -  p*)) with  Var(A(pi  -  pj)) in some 
industrialized  countries, looking  at 1-, 3-, 6-, and 12-month horizons.  For 
some  measures,  the consumer  goods  are fairly narrowly  defined  (pota- 
toes, televisions,  wine),  although  for some  other measures  the goods  are 
quite  aggregated  (food,  services,  energy,  rent). That paper simply  tabu- 
lates  Var(A(pi  -  s  -  p*)) for  all  goods  and  countries,  and  Var(A(pi  -  pj)) 
for all goods  and countries, and compares their sizes. In general, the mea- 
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at all horizons.  The median  value  of Var(A(pi -  s  -  p*)) is about 6 or 7 
times as large as the median  value  of Var(A(pi -  pj)) for all measures  at 
all horizons. 
Rogers and Jenkins (1995) extend  this analysis,  with  a focus  on U.S.- 
Canadian  consumer  prices.  They  confirm  the  large  deviations  from 
LOOP, and in addition  find the deviations  are very persistent. 
Engel  (1999) decomposes  real-exchange-rate  variation  into  a compo- 
nent attributable to deviations  from LOOP and a component  attributable 
to changes in the relative price of nontraded goods. Consider a price index 
for a country  that is a weighted  geometric  average  of traded- and non- 
traded-goods  prices: 
Pt =  (1 -  a)pT +  apt. 
We can also write 
pt  =  (1 -  P)pT*  +  pJN*. 
Then the real exchange  rate is given  by 
qt =  Xt +  yt,  (1) 
where  qt  st +  pF -  pt,  t  St +  p*  -  pT, and  yt  m  (pN  -  pT)  - 
a(p  -  pt). 
The log of the real exchange rate is composed  of two parts: the relative 
price of traded goods  between  the countries, xt; and a component  that is 
a weighted  difference of the relative price of nontraded- to traded-goods 
prices in each country, yt. Engel (1999) then decomposes  the mean squared 
error of changes in U.S. real exchange rates into parts attributable to xt and 
yt (and a part attributed to their comovement,  which is small) at different 
horizons. That study uses four separate measures of prices, and finds that 
the deviations  from LOOP account  for over  90% of movements  in U.S. 
real exchange  rates relative to almost all countries  at all horizons  for all 
measures. 
Here I replicate and extend some of that analysis, using consumer-price 
data  from  the  OECD Main  Economic  Indicators  (available  from  Data- 
stream). Data are monthly  (from 1973:12 to 2001:1) on four components 
of the consumer  price index: food,  all commodities  less  food,  rent, and 
all services less rent, for eleven  OECD countries.8 The first two goods  are 
8. The United  States, Canada, Japan, France, Italy, Switzerland,  Belgium,  Norway,  Spain, 
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tradables, and the last two are nontradables. I construct price indexes  for 
a consumer  that has Cobb-Douglas  preferences  and weights  these items 
with the same weights  they receive in the 2001 U.S. consumer price index.9 
In terms of the formula above, the weights  a and P are set equal to 0.587 
for all countries. In practice, the U.S. weight  for nontraded goods is higher 
than for almost all OECD countries, but this should  only bias the results 
in favor of finding  a significant  role for the relative  price of nontraded 
goods  (the yt-component). 
The constructed  qt,  xt, and yt are all very persistent. Even though  there 
are 27 years of monthly  data, an augmented  Dickey-Fuller  (ADF) test is 
able to reject a unit root at the 5% level  for only 9 of the 55 qt-series, 9 of 
the 55 xt-series, and 8 of the 55 yt-series. At the 1%  level, there are rejections 
only  in one case for each of the three series.?1  All of the series had first- 
order serial correlation over 0.90 and, except in a few cases, over 0.96. So, 
in examining movements  in these series, it makes sense to look at changes 
rather than levels. 
Figure 1 plots 
MSE(x, 
- 
Xt_j)  MSE(x  -xt  x-j)  for  j =  1, 2, . . .,  18, 
MSE(x, -  x,-j) +  MSE(yt -  yt-j) 
where  MSE stands  for mean  squared  error. These  statistics were  calcu- 
lated for 55 real exchange rates, but plots for only 10 are included because 
of space considerations.1  Engel (1999) presents  similar plots  using  these 
data, but  only  for five  countries,  and  only  for U.S. real exchange  rates. 
Any  variance or mean-squared-error  decomposition  must  find a way  to 
deal with comovements.  Here, we leave the comovements  of xt and yt out 
of both the numerator and denominator  of the MSE ratios. In practice the 
comovements  account  for very  little of the mean  squared  error of real- 
exchange-rate changes. The correlation of the series generally was highest 
in absolute value  at short horizons,  but at those horizons  the correlation 
was  almost always  negative-so  the sum of the variances  of xt and yt is 
greater than the variance of qt. 
The decompositions  shown  in Figure 1 for the U.S. real-exchange-rate 
series confirm the findings  of Engel (1999). Nearly  all of the movements 
in real exchange  rates are attributed to xt, the component  that measures 
deviations  from LOOP. For all but the U.S.-Canada  rate, xt's share of the 
9. Weights: 0.157 for food; 0.256 for commodities  less food; 0.312 for rent; 0.275 for services 
less  rent. 
10. All of the ADF tests included  a constant, no time trend, and three lags. 
11. The NBER working  paper version,  Engel (2002), includes  all 55 plots. 246 * ENGEL 
Figure 1 MSE DECOMPOSITION OF REAL-EXCHANGE-RATE CHANGES 
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mean squared error is above 0.90 at all horizons.  Usually  it is above 0.95. 
Only for the U.S.-Canada  rate does  it dip below  0.90 at the longer hori- 
zons,  and then only  to 0.893 for 18-month changes. 
A similar finding holds  for cross-continental  real exchange  rates-that 
is, Japanese (relative to North America and Europe) and Canadian (rela- 
tive to Europe). The xt-component accounts for over 90% of the MSE share 
for  all  real  exchange  rates  at  all  horizons.12 Usually  the  share  is  well 
over 95%. 
The story for within-Europe  real exchange  rates is only slightly  differ- 
ent.  While  xt's share is  often  less  than 90%, for 19 of  the  28 European 
country pairs it is never less than 80% at any horizon. The nine pairs where 
xt's share  falls  below  0.80, and  the  range  at all horizons  for xt's share 
for  those  country  pairs,  are: Spain-Italy,  0.75-0.86;  Denmark-France, 
0.68-0.87;  Norway-Netherlands,  0.73-0.88;  Belgium-Netherlands,  0.67- 
0.89; Switzerland-Netherlands,  0.74-0.89;  Denmark-Netherlands,  0.59- 
0.71; Denmark-Norway,  0.73-0.89;  Denmark-Belgium,  0.63-0.71;  and 
Denmark-Switzerland,  0.77-0.89. 
The fact that the deviations  from LOOP are a slightly  smaller share of 
real-exchange-rate movements  for intra-European country pairs suggests 
that  perhaps  the  deviations  from  LOOP are not  really  attributable  to 
sticky  consumer  prices. Perhaps they  arise because  transportation costs 
cause imperfect integration of markets. The somewhat  smaller failures of 
LOOP for the European  pairs might  reflect the fact that transportation 
costs are lower for within-European  trade than for cross-continental trade. 
On the other hand, during 1974-2001,  intra-European nominal  exchange 
rates have  been  less  volatile  than the  cross-continental  exchange  rates. 
So, the fact that deviations  from LOOP are smaller within  Europe is con- 
sistent with  sticky nominal  consumer  prices and deviations  arising from 
nominal-exchange-rate  fluctuations. The next section helps  to shed some 
light on this question. 
Betts and  Kehoe  (2001) recently  have  performed  similar  decomposi- 
tions  for a large number  of countries,  finding  somewhat  more evidence 
that  the  relative  price  of  nontraded  goods  drives  real exchange  rates. 
However,  there are two reasons why  their results should be treated with 
a bit of caution.  They measure  qt, the real exchange  rate, using  relative 
consumer  price indexes  in essentially  the same  way  as I do.13  But their 
12. Except for the Danish-Canadian  share at the 1-month horizon,  which  is 0.893. 
13. One difference is that I construct real exchange rates for consumers who weight  the four 
main components  with equal weights  in all countries, while they simply  used published 
CPIs. Thus, their real-exchange-rate changes  may reflect changes  in relative prices that 
get reflected in real exchange  rates because  goods  receive  different weights  across na- 
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measure  of x, is not a CPI measure of traded goods.  Instead they take xt 
to be the relative producer price indexes  across countries (that is, s + log 
PP*  -  log PPI). This measure  of xt might vary over time even  if LOOP 
held for all traded goods and CPI weights  for traded goods were identical. 
That is because it measures xt using output weights  rather than consump- 
tion weights.  Output weights  can be very different across countries even 
when  CPI weights  are not.  A  more  substantial  reason  why  Betts  and 
Kehoe attribute more of real-exchange-rate movements  to yt is that they 
measure  yt as simply  qt -  x.  As I argued  in Engel (1999), where  I also 
employed  this measure  of yt (as one of the four measures  of yt I consid- 
ered), a serious bias is introduced by measurement error in this case. Since 
xt and qt  are measured from different pricing surveys (PPI and CPI), where 
no effort is made to reconcile the pricing errors there will be largely uncor- 
related measurement  errors in the two  series. This in turn implies  there 
will be a potentially  large negative  correlation between  the measure of xt 
and the measure  of yt (=  qt -  xt). Indeed, in Engel (1999), I found  that xt 
and yt measured  in this way  were  highly  negatively  correlated. Decom- 
posing  the real exchange  rate into xt and yt components  is problematic 
because  one  must  find a way  to deal with  the negative  correlation. Al- 
though  their results  are similar to mine,  Betts and Kehoe do  attribute a 
larger share of the variance of annual changes  in real exchange  rates to 
the nontraded  goods  (yt), even for the countries that I consider here. I do 
not find that the difference  in our findings  is attributable to differences 
in methodology,  and so I must  conclude  that they arise from the differ- 
ence in the way  we  measure  the price of tradable goods. 
In essence, Devereux  and Engel (2001) take the evidence  against LOOP 
for consumer  goods  as support  for the position  that nominal-exchange- 
rate changes are not passed  through to consumer prices because of local- 
currency pricing. But there are other ways  to interpret the evidence  that 
do not rely on LCP behavior.  We turn to a few  of these alternatives. 
7. Shipping  Costs 
One explanation for why  LOOP fails is that home and foreign consumers 
are consuming  slightly  different products. That is, suppose  a given prod- 
uct can be produced  in both the home  and the foreign  country. Let the 
per-unit iceberg transport cost for exported goods  be 8, as in OR (2000b). 
Let PH  be the domestic-currency  price of the good  in the home  country, 
and PF be the foreign-currency  price of the good  in the foreign country. 
The two  goods  are perfect substitutes  for households.  Then, 
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If the home price is within this band, there is no passthrough  of exchange 
rates to domestic  prices. On the edges  of the band, passthrough  is com- 
plete. But this model has the untenable implication that zero passthrough 
occurs only because  there is no trade. 
A  more  satisfactory  version  of  the  transportation-cost  theory  is  that 
there are two  varieties  of the good,  one produced  in the home  country 
and the other produced  in the foreign country. Assume  CES utility (and 
no differences in tastes between  home and foreign residents) and an elas- 
ticity of substitution between  varieties greater than 1. If the elasticity and 
the per-unit transport costs are high enough,  foreign varieties may consti- 
tute a small share of overall consumption  and thus a small share in the 
measured  price of home-country  consumption.  The reverse will  be true 
of the foreign country. LOOP may fail grossly for the price index of these 
two  goods. 
Let Pi be the price of a particular good.  However,  Pi is itself an index 
over the price of two  varieties  of the good-one  produced  at home  and 
one in the foreign country. Suppose  home  and foreign households  have 
the same preferences  for the good: 
Ci = 
[aCi  -1)/  +  (1  -  ai1)/X/(X 
where  the subscript i is for the good,  of which  there are two types: H for 
home  and F for foreign.  Let the per-unit  iceberg  transport cost  for ex- 
ported  goods  be 8. The home-country  producer  is the only  producer  of 
the home  variety, and the foreign producer the only producer of the for- 
eign  variety.  LOOP holds  exclusive  of  transport costs.  We  have  P*  = 
(1  +  6)PiH/S and  PiF  =  (1  +  8)SP*. The rest of the macro model  is the 
same as specified  above. 
Under  flexible  nominal  prices,  PiH/PiF  and  Pi*/Pi*  respond  to  real 
shocks. If nominal prices are sticky as in the Friedman framework of PCP, 
it is clear that a flexible exchange  rate is necessary  to achieve  a desirable 
response  of PiH/Pi  (or P*/PI)  to real shocks. This framework potentially 
is also consistent with the observation that measured  consumer prices do 
not respond  much  to exchange-rate  changes.  We have: 
Pi =  [aXPJIH  +  (1  -  a)  Pl  -]1/(1-X) 
=  [axpIHX +  (1  -  a)x  (1  +  6)l-S1l-;pl-1]l/(l1-) 
The passthrough  elasticity  for the home  country, for example,  is 
(1  -  a)(1l  +  6)l-XS1-  XP1  - 
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For X >  1, we  have  ? -  0 as 6 ->  oo. If the  cost  of the  foreign  good  is high 
enough,  there will  not be much  effect of exchange  rates on home  con- 
sumer prices if the foreign  good  is a sufficiently  high  substitute  for the 
domestic  good.  For foreign prices (in domestic-currency  terms); 
SP*  =  S[oCPI-  k +  (1  O- o)WP  -]1/(1-) 
=  [a  (1+  s)1  -PHX  +  (1  -  )XS1-  pi*-X]/(1  0-A) 
If shipping  costs  were  zero,  so  6  =  0, LOOP would  hold  for good  i. 
That is, we would  have Pi/ SP* =  1. But as 8 increases above zero, devia- 
tions from LOOP for good  i (that is, for the index of the price of varieties 
H  and  F) increase.  Taking  a  Taylor  series  expansion,  the  variance  of 
ln(Pi/SP*)  =  pi -  s -  p* equals  approximately 
( 1)  (Z  Var(X),  where  z = (1 + 6)A-1 
zk~  t-1  + 
and  X  1-  C  P 
C(a  )  SPiF 
As the shipping costs increase, the variance of pi -  s -  p* increases (hold- 
ing the variance of X constant.) 
Several studies  have  examined  how  the variations  of deviations  from 
LOOP are related to distance, which  is taken to be a proxy for shipping 
costs.  Engel  and  Rogers  (1996)  posit  that  the  standard  deviation  of 
changes  in pi -  s  -  p* is related to distance.  Their comparison  is made 
for 14 disaggregated  CPI categories (food at home, food away from home, 
men's and boy's apparel, etc.) and for 23 cities in North America-9  Cana- 
dian cities and 14 U.S. cities. They found that deviations  from LOOP were 
significantly  related  to distance  between  locations.  But they  also  found 
that, even  taking  into  account  the  distance  effect,  the  deviations  from 
LOOP were much larger when comparing goods prices between  U.S. and 
Canadian  cities  than  when  comparing  prices  for city  pairs  within  the 
United  States or Canada. That is, there is a large border  effect. 
Similar findings have been confirmed for U.S.-Japanese  prices (Parsley 
and Wei 2001a), and intra-European prices (Engel and Rogers, 2001; Pars- 
ley  and Wei, 2001b). Parsley  and Wei's  studies  used  data on very  nar- 
rowly defined consumer goods  (for example, boxes of facial tissues, men's 
jeans, imported  whiskey).  Each of  these  studies  confirms  that distance 
between  locations  is a significant  explanatory  variable for the standard 
deviation of pi -  s -  p*. But these studies go further, and find that volatil- Expenditure  Switching  and  Exchange-Rate  Policy  *  251 
ity of nominal  exchange  rates plays a much greater role in accounting for 
the volatility  of deviations  from LOOP. 
Here I shall present  some  evidence  that is similar in spirit to the evi- 
dence  presented  in  those  papers.  My  traded-goods  price  data  are not 
nearly  as disaggregated  as the data in the  other studies:  I will  use  the 
OECD data on consumer prices for food and for all commodities  exclud- 
ing food  that I described  in the previous  section. 
In Table 1, I report cross-section  regressions,  in which  the dependent 
variable is the standard deviation  of changes in pi -  s -  p* (for food, and 
for commodities  less  food),  so  there are 55 observations  in each cross- 
section regression,  representing  the standard deviation  of pi -  s -  p* for 
each of the 55 country pairs. The top panel reports regressions for 1-month 
changes,  and the bottom panel for 12-month changes. The shipping  costs 
are captured  by  DIST, which  measures  the log  of the distance  between 
the capital cities. It is difficult to gauge  the correct form of the nonlinear 
relationship  between  distance  and  shipping  costs,  especially  over  large 
intercontinental  distances. So the regressions  also include  a dummy  vari- 
able that takes on a value  of 1 if one of the countries in the country pair 
is Japan (JADUM), and another dummy  that is 1 if the country pair has 
one country in North  America and another in Europe (ATLDUM). 
For both food and nonfood  goods, the coefficient on log distance is posi- 
tive and highly significant for both 1-month and 12-month changes. This is 
in accord with the transportation-cost theory of deviations  from LOOP. 
Another  approach  is to take bilateral trade volumes  as a measure  of 
integration  between  two  countries.  Table 1 reports regressions  that use 
the log of bilateral trade volumes  instead of the log of distance as an ex- 
planatory  variable.14  Two  sets  of regressions  are reported.  The first are 
OLS in which  the bilateral trade volumes  are deflated by the product  of 
GDPs  of the trading  pairs. The second  are IV regressions  in which  the 
undeflated bilateral trade volumes  are explained in a first stage by a grav- 
ity model-using  the log of distance and the log of the product of GDPs 
as instruments. For both food and nonfood  goods, the coefficient on log of 
trade is positive  and significant for both 1-month and 12-month changes. 
However,  as was noted in the previous  section, countries that are closer 
together,  or that have  higher  (scaled) bilateral trade volumes,  also tend 
to have lower nominal-exchange-rate  volatility. So the transportation-cost 
effects  that Table 1 reports may be overstating  the value  of distance  or 
trade. In Table 2, the same regressions are run, but also using the standard 
14. These data were taken from Andrew Rose's Web site, http://haas.berkeley.edu/ 
-arose/RecRes.htm. They are the data  used in Frankel  and Rose (2002).  I take  the aver- 




Table 1  REGRESSIONS OF RELATIVE PRICE VOLATILITY ON  DISTANCE OR TRADE VOLUMES 
Log of 
volume of 
Standard  deviation of  Estimation  Log of  bilateral 
relative  price of  No.  method  distance  trade  Constant  JADUM  ATLDUM  R2 
One-Month  Differences 
1  OLS 
2  OLS 
3  IV 
Nonfood  commodities  4  OLS 
5  OLS 
6  IV 





















































0.82 Twelve-Month  Differences 
7  OLS 
8  OLS 
9  IV 
Nonfood  commodities  10  OLS 
























































t-statistics  in parentheses.  All regressions  use  55 country-pair  observations. 
Dependent  variable in regression  is specified  in leftmost  column.  Standard  deviations  are calculated  from monthly  data, 1973:12-2001:1.  IV estimation  uses  log 












Table 2  REGRESSIONS OF RELATIVE PRICE VOLATILITY ON  DISTANCE OR TRADE VOLUMES AND  ON 
VOLATILITY  OF NOMINAL  EXCHANGE  RATES 
Standard 
Log of  deviation 
volume of  of nominal 
Std. dev. of relative  Est.  Log of  bilateral  exchange 
price of  No.  method  distance  trade  rate  Constant  JADUM  ATLDUM  R2 
One-Month  Differences 
13  OLS  0.041 
(1.07) 
14  OLS 
15  IV 
Nonfood  commod.  16  OLS  0.17 
(1.91) 
17  OLS 































































0.89 Twelve-Month  Differences 
19  OLS  0.026 
(1.67) 
20  OLS 
21  IV 
Nonfood  commod.  22  OLS  0.0083 
(2.98) 
23  OLS 
24  IV 
0.86  -0.0006  0.0014  -0.0030  0.99 
(20.62)  (-0.71)  (0.37)  (-0.93) 
-0.0005  0.88  -0.002  0.0049  -0.0005  0.98 
(-0.51)  (20.40)  (-0.09)  (1.52)  (-0.17) 
-0.0005  0.88  0.017  0.0058  0.0002  0.98 
(-1.04)  (23.17)  (1.90)  (1.78)  (0.05) 
0.72  -0.031  -0.0014  0.0027  0.96 
(9.77)  (-1.97)  (-0.21)  (0.48) 
-0.0060  0.68  -0.11  0.0075  0.0082  0.96 
(-4.09)  (9.73)  (-3.60)  (1.42)  (1.74) 
-0.0012  0.81  0.033  0.012  0.012  0.95 
(-1.29)  (11.74)  (2.11)  (2.01)  (2.36) 
t-statistics in parentheses.  All regressions  use  55 observations. 
Dependent  variable in regression  is specified  in leftmost  column.  Standard  deviations  are calculated  from monthly  data,  1973:12-2001:1.  IV estimation  uses  log 
of distance  and log  of products  of GDP as instruments. 
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deviation  of the nominal exchange  rate as an explanatory variable. In all 
cases, the standard deviation  of the nominal  exchange  rate is highly  sig- 
nificant. In comparison with Table 1, the absolute values of the coefficients 
on the trade and distance  variables fall greatly, and their statistical sig- 
nificance also falls. 
Table 3 reports an analysis  of variance for each of the regressions  re- 
ported  in Table 2. The purpose  of Table 3 is to show  how  much  of the 
"explained" variance of the dependent  variable is attributable to the stan- 
dard deviation  of nominal  exchange  rates, the integration variable (dis- 
tance or trade volume),  the dummy  variables, and their interaction. Table 
3 reveals  that distance  or trade volume  accounts  for a small fraction of 
the explained  variance in all of the reported regressions.  In eight  of the 
twelve  regressions,  it accounts  for 1% or less  of the explained  variance. 
In one  regression  it accounts  for 16.4%, and  in the remaining  three for 
less than 10%. In contrast, in all of the regressions, the standard deviation 
of the nominal exchange rate accounts for a large fraction of the explained 
variance. In all but one case it is over 50%, and in most cases it is over 80%. 
So, even  though  distances  or trade volumes  are sometimes  significant in 
explaining  the standard deviation  of pi -  s -  p*, they do not carry much 
of the load in explaining  it. 
In the  transportation-cost  model,  the  behavior  of  nominal  exchange 
rates plays no role in explaining  the deviations  from the law of one price. 
The deviations  result from a real trading cost. The models  make no men- 
tion of these costs differing across nominal-exchange-rate  regimes. In the 
LCP model, by contrast, deviations  from LOOP are volatile precisely be- 
cause  nominal  exchange  rates  are  volatile.  The  empirical  work  cited 
above,  and the new  work  reported here, shows  there is a role for both 
models  in explaining  the deviations  from LOOP. But the implication  of 
the analysis  of variance  in Table 3 is that the proxies  for trading  costs 
account for a very small fraction of the variation in prices across countries 
compared  to nominal-exchange-rate  fluctuations. 
These empirical studies  certainly do not perfectly measure transporta- 
tion  costs,  or their effects  on  deviations  from LOOP. However,  even  if 
transportation  costs  were  much  more  significant,  this  model  actually 
would  not  support  a  strong  expenditure-switching  effect.  The  reason 
there is so little passthrough  of exchange  rates to consumer prices in the 
home  country  in the transportation-cost  model  is that foreign  varieties 
are a small share of total consumption.  In fact, ? measures  not only  the 
elasticity of consumer prices with respect to a change in the price of for- 
eign  goods; it also measures  the share of foreign goods  in expenditures. 
So passthrough  can only be small in this model  if the expenditure  share 
on  foreign  varieties  is small.  The case for floating  rates is weak  in this Table 3  ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE  OF REGRESSIONS FROM TABLE 2 
Variance of  Variance of  Covariance  of 
s.d. of  distance or  ex. rate and  Covariance of 
Regression  exchange-rate  trade  trade or distance  Variance of  dummies with 
no.  component  component  component  dummies  nondummies 
1-month  changes 
13  80.6  0.5  9.7  3.4  9.7 
14  87.8  0.3  -4.5  4.5  12.0 
15  77.8  1.0  1.4  5.9  13.8 
16  46.1  16.4  25.4  1.2  10.9 
17  67.9  0.1  2.1  8.3  21.7 
18  50.6  7.4  3.0  14.6  24.4 
12-month  changes 
19  92.8  0.8  7.7  0.2  -1.5 
20  95.8  0.0  1.5  0.3  2.4 
21  96.0  0.0  0.3  0.4  3.3 
22  69.0  8.0  21.5  0.2  1.3 
23  64.2  6.1  17.1  1.5  11.1 
24  81.7  0.2  0.6  3.1  14.4 
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case. Floating rates might be needed  to achieve optimal relative-price ad- 
justments, but those adjustments are not very important to the function- 
ing of the economy  in this model. 
In fact, OR (2000b) reason that the low passthrough  to consumer prices 
cannot be  fully  explained  by  transportation  costs,  and  that some  other 
factors must be at play. 
8. Nontraded  Distribution  Services  and PCP 
One  possible  explanation  for  the  apparent  nonresponsiveness  of  con- 
sumer prices to exchange-rate  changes  is that CPIs measure  the price of 
a basket of both consumer  goods  and the distribution services that bring 
the goods  to consumers. LOOP might very well hold for the actual physi- 
cal good  (as in PCP models),  but the measured  consumer  price includes 
the price of the distribution  service,  which  is nontraded  and for which 
LOOP need not hold.  Recent examples  of papers that have  adopted  this 
type  of model  are McCallum  and  Nelson  (2000), Burstein, Neves,  and 
Rebelo  (2000), and  Burstein, Eichenbaum,  and  Rebelo  (2002).15  None  of 
these papers provide  direct evidence  on the role of distribution  costs in 
accounting  for real-exchange-rate changes. 
Let the home price of imported good i be a composite  of a traded-goods 
price Pi for which  LOOP holds  (Pi =  SP*) and the price of a nontraded 
distribution service (Pis).  If output of the final consumer product is a CES 
function  of the traded good  and the distribution  service  (with elasticity 
equal to X), the price of the final product  can be written  as 
Pi = [acXPl + (1 -  aXPil-]1/(1  -  = [oaXPs + (1 -  XSl-X1-X]1/(1-X)  (2) 
If P* is fixed in foreign-currency terms, the passthrough  of exchange rates 
is given  by: 
_  (1  -  a)KSl-P*'1-' 
caXPls- +  (1  -  a)Sl-P*l-' 
As a --  1, E  -> 0. That is, as the share of the nontraded distribution service 
increases toward unity,  the passthrough  elasticity falls toward  zero. 
We cannot usually  observe Pi and P* directly, but we  might be able to 
examine  this hypothesis  using  only measures  of the consumer price and 
15. The model  of OR (2000a) could  be interpreted this way.  The final good  in that type of 
model is a composite of a traded home-produced  good, a traded foreign-produced  good, 
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a measure of the price of services. To simplify  matters, let the production 
function  be Cobb-Douglas  [so X ->  1 in (2)]. The price of good  i in the 
home  compared  to the foreign  country is 
p  -  s  -  p*  k +  ax  +  (1  -  a)u,  (3) 
where  lowercase  letters  mean  logs,  the  subscripts  i  are dropped,  k is 
a  constant,  a  is  the  cost  share  of  nontraded  distribution  services, 
x  ps -  s  -  p*  is  the  price  of  services  in  the  home  country  relative  to 
the foreign  country,  and  u  p  -  s  -  p* is the price  deviation  for the 
traded good. Under the null LOOP, u should in principle be zero, but the 
null might allow for a small i.i.d. error. So equation (3) could be estimated. 
It should have a good  fit and yield a tight estimate of a if the distribution 
cost model  is true. 
But estimating  this equation  is not useful  for distinguishing  between 
the  model  in  which  prices  are equalized  for the  traded  good  and  the 
model  in which  there is local-currency  pricing  for the traded  good.  To 
allow  for  this  alternative,  let  u  =  -ys  +  ?. Under  LOOP  for  the  traded 
good,  y =  0. Under LCP, y =  1. The quantity 1 -  y is the degree  of pass- 
through. Assume  that ? is uncorrelated with  s and has a small variance. 
Also,  define  v =  ps -  p*, and assume  for purposes  of exposition  that it 
is also uncorrelated with s. Then x  v -  s. Under these assumptions,  the 
probability  limit of the OLS estimate  of a from equation  (3) is given  by 
a  +  (1  -  a)[Cov(e,  v)  +  y Var(s)] 
Var(v) +  Var(s) 
Under  the hypothesis  that LOOP holds  for the traded good  (y =  0), the 
asymptotic  bias is small, since Cov(?, v)/Var(s)  is likely to be small. But 
when  y =  1, the asymptotic  bias of the estimate of a from this regression 
could  be large. As Var(s) gets large, the probability limit of the estimate 
of a approaches a + (1 -  a) = 1. Under the alternative of LCP, estimating 
equation  (3) would  return a large estimate  of a. The equation  would  fit 
well  and  appear to attribute most  of the variation  of p -  s  -  p* to the 
relative services  component.  Estimating  (3) is not a good  way  to test for 
the model  in which  LOOP holds  for the traded  good  (and the services 
component  accounts for all of the deviations  in the CPI prices across coun- 
tries), vs. the LCP model. 
Suppose,  however,  we  could  group  u with  x and estimate 
p -  s -  p  =  k +  a(x  -  u) +  u.  (4) 260  ENGEL 
The probability limit of the estimate of a from this regression is given by 
oc +  Cov(E, v) -  Var(?) -  y(l  -  y) Var(s) 
Var(v) +  Var(?) -  2 Cov(?, v) +  (1 -  y)2Var(s) 
When Y =  0, the asymptotic  bias is small because  Var(s) is large relative 
to the other variances and covariances. The R2  from the regression should 
be high, because x -  u = v -  ? + s in this case, which has a high variance 
relative to the regression error, u = e. But under LCP (y =  1) the asymp- 
totic bias  is much  higher,  and  likely  to be negative  if Cov(e, v) is near 
zero. Moreover, the R2  will be low, since x -  u = v -  E has small variance 
and the regression  error u =  -  s +  ? has large variance. So, if LCP were 
important, the coefficient estimate  and R2  from this regression would  be 
very  different  than if LOOP held  for the  traded good.  This might  be  a 
useful  approach to distinguish  the models. 
Fortunately, we  can observe x -  u up to a constant of proportionality, 
because x -  u = [1/(1  -  a)[p  -  p -  (p* -  p*)].  Substituting into equation 
(8.3), we  arrive at the equation we  propose  to estimate: 
p -  s -  p* = k +  [ps-  p -  (ps*  -  *)] + u.  (5) 
1-a 
To sum up the previous  discussion: Under the hypothesis  that nontraded 
distribution services account for the observed deviations  across countries 
in consumer  prices, while  LOOP holds  well  for the actual traded good, 
the slope coefficient in the regression should be strongly positive  and the 
R2 should  be high. Alternatively,  if there is LCP for the traded good,  the 
slope  coefficient is biased  downward  (and may be negative),  and the R2 
will  be low  [especially  if Var(s) is high]. 
We do not observe the cost of the distribution services, ps, directly. But 
we  can use  as a proxy  the OECD prices of services  (excluding  rent) de- 
scribed  above  in  Section  6. We  use  as  our  measure  of  the  observable 
traded-goods  price, p, the traded-goods  price that was  constructed  from 
the OECD data on food  prices and prices of nonfood  commodities. 
As we  noted  above,  the measures  of p -  s -  p* are highly  persistent 
for all 55 country pairs, and we fail to reject a unit root in almost all cases. 
Similarly, ps -  p -  (p* -  p*) is persistent. We reject a unit root at the 5% 
level  for only  nine  of the 55 country pairs, and at the 1% level  for only 
two. So we  will  examine  the relationship between  changes  in p -  s -  p* 
and changes in ps -  p -  (p* -  p*).  We regress 1-month (2-month, 3-month, 
...,  24-month) changes in p -  s -  p* on 1-month (2-month, 3-month,..., 
24-month) changes  in ps -  p -  (p* -  p*). Expenditure  Switching  and Exchange-Rate  Policy  ?  261 
Figure 2 presents  plots  of the estimated  slope  coefficient  from the re- 
gressions  for the 24 horizons,  with  one  graph  for 10 of the 55 country 
pairs. Figure 3 plots  the R2's from those regressions.16 
The  results  indicate  poor  performance  for  the  distribution-services 
model  at the shortest horizons.  For horizons less than 6 months, there are 
no  cases  in which  the  coefficient  is positive  and  the R2 is  greater than 
0.07. In many  instances,  the coefficient  on the relative  price of services 
is negative.  For all of the intra-European country pairs, which  have  low 
nominal-exchange-rate  volatility,  the coefficient is negative  at horizons of 
1 to 6 months.  In some  cases the R2 is high  (in the range of 0.15 to 0.45) 
in these regressions.  As we would  expect under LCP, the lowest  R2's are 
for the country pairs that have the highest nominal-exchange-rate  volatil- 
ity-country  pairs involving  the U.S., Japan, and Canada with  overseas 
partners. 
At  the  longest  horizons,  the  distribution-services  model  fares  only 
slightly  better. It is still the case that the coefficient estimates  is negative 
at the longer  horizons  for almost  all of the European country  pairs. Of 
the 28 European country pairs, only nine display  positive  coefficients  at 
all of the horizons  from 19 to 24 months. Two more have positive  coeffi- 
cients at the 23- and 24-month horizons.  In only one of these eleven cases 
(Belgium-Norway)  is the R2 above 0.20. The distribution-services  model 
appears to explain  a bit more for the 27 country pairs that are not intra- 
European. In 14 cases,  the regression  coefficient  is positive  at all of the 
longer horizons  (19 to 24 months),  and in 2 additional  cases it is positive 
for some  of the longer horizons.  Of these  16 country pairs with  positive 
coefficient estimates  at longer horizons,  only 3 (Belgium-U.S.,  Belgium- 
Canada, and Netherlands-U.S.)  have  R2's greater than 0.20. 
Goldberg and Verboven  (2001a) (hereinafter referred to as GV) have a 
related  empirical  study  that appears  to find much  stronger evidence  in 
favor  of the  distribution-services  approach.  GV use  extremely  detailed 
data  for automobile  prices  sold  in five  European  countries.  They have 
prices of specific models  for 15 years, data on characteristics of the auto- 
mobiles  (horsepower,  size,  luxury  features, etc.), production  location  of 
each model,  and some  data on income  of buyers. They use tax data, and 
make use of data on import restrictions. In short, their data are compre- 
hensive  and much better than the data used  here. 
In essence,  GV estimate  a version  of equation  (3). However,  they  do 
not simply  allow the deviation  from LOOP for the traded good to appear 
as an error term in the regression. They are not able to observe u. But they 
build  a highly  complex  model  of automobile  demand  and  the pricing- 
16. The NBER working  paper version,  Engel (2002), presents plots for all 55 country pairs. 262 - ENGEL 
Figure 2 COEFFICIENT  ESTIMATES FOR REGRESSION OF TRADED PRICES 
ON SERVICE PRICES 
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Figure  3 R2  FROM  REGRESSIONS  REPORTED  IN FIGURE  2 
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to-market behavior  of automobile  producers.  Combining  these, they use 
sophisticated  nonlinear  methods  to come  up with  a measure  of the de- 
sired degree  of price discrimination  by firms. Although  this does not do 
justice to GV's work, in essence their empirical model could be expressed 
as an extension  of (3): 
p -  s -  p* =  k +  ax  +  y + r. 
Relative to (3), the term y represents the sophisticated  estimate of desired 
price discrimination by firms. The error term rj represents all the elements 
not captured by y, so 1  =  (1 -  a)u  -  y. 
GV's approach is a reasonable and very admirable attempt to deal with 
the unobservability  of u. My hunch-and  this obviously  deserves  further 
study-is  that GV still do not capture the full degree of price discrimina- 
tion. In fact, if producers are simply  setting prices in local currencies (be- 
cause,  say, of menu  costs), the model  of GV will  certainly underpredict 
the degree of desired local-currency price stability for the imported good. 
So the residual remaining  in the GV regression  will  still be highly  nega- 
tively correlated with s, and therefore highly positively  correlated with x. 
As a result, GV will tend to attribute too much to the distribution services 
component  x. 
GV believe  they rule out the possibility  of transitory price stickiness by 
estimating  their equation in levels  over a 15-year period-to  capture the 
long-run  pricing  equation.  However,  real exchange  rates are extremely 
persistent  (see Rogoff,  1996). Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000) show 
that when price setting is asynchronized,  the adjustment can be very slow. 
Rogoff cites a half-life for the real exchange  rate of 3-5  years. With such 
slow  adjustment  of prices, the  15-year sample  that GV use  may  not be 
sufficient to capture only  long-run  pricing behavior. 
Even if the distribution-services  hypothesis  is correct, it might  imply 
that  the  role  for nominal-exchange-rate  flexibility  is  small.  In this  ap- 
proach, the reason that nominal exchange rates have low passthrough  to 
consumer  prices is that the distribution  services  are a large component 
of the cost of consumer goods.  As in the model with transportation costs, 
if the nontraded  marketing  services  are such  a large component  of the 
cost of consumer  goods  that we  barely observe  any effect of exchange- 
rate passthrough,  then the physical  import must not be a very important 
component  of our consumer basket. Exchange-rate flexibility is desirable 
for achieving  relative  price adjustments,  but these  relative price adjust- 
ments may not be very significant. The cost of the physical  traded good 
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the optimal  relative-price  change  for this component  may not influence 
welfare  much. 
9.  Imports  as Intermediate  Goods 
Obstfeld  (2001) models  imported  goods  as intermediate  products.  They 
are combined  with  products  produced  locally  to make  final consumer 
goods  (which are nontraded). There is complete passthrough  of exchange 
rates to imported-goods  prices  in this  framework.  That is,  the price  of 
imported  goods  is set in the producers'  currencies, so the imported price 
varies one for one with the exchange rate. But imported goods are not sold 
directly to consumers.  The price of the final good  is set in the consumers' 
currencies. 
This model,  then,  is  completely  consistent  with  the  observation  that 
consumer  prices  do not respond  much  to exchange-rate  changes  in the 
short run. But there is still an important role for exchange-rate flexibility 
in changing relative prices. The final-goods producer faces a sourcing  deci- 
sion-to  use  imported  intermediates  or locally  produced  intermediates. 
There is not perfect substitutability  between  the two, but there is some.17 
So a nominal-exchange-rate  adjustment can change the price of imported 
relative to locally produced  intermediates. 
There is a single  final consumer  good,  sold by a monopolist  that buys 
intermediate  inputs  in competitive  markets. The price of the final good 
in the home  country is P, and it is fixed in home  currency. 
The cost of producing  the good  is not fixed ex ante. The cost is given 
by 
=  [  +  (1  -  )S1-XP1-X]1/(1-. 
Here, PH  is the price of the home-produced  intermediate good. That good 
is produced  using  a variety  of labor inputs.  In the Obstfeld  setup,  each 
household  is  a monopoly  supplier  of a unique  type  of labor. Nominal 
wages  are fixed  ex ante. The intermediate-goods  market is competitive 
with free entry. The price PH  is in principle flexible, but under competitive 
conditions  it is equal  to the ex ante fixed nominal  wage.  (In Obstfeld's 
model,  there  are  no  productivity  shocks,  but  there  are  labor-supply 
shocks.  The labor input per unit of output  is fixed at unity.) 
Likewise,  PF is the price of the foreign-produced  intermediate  in the 
foreign currency. The structure of the foreign intermediate  market is the 
same as that of the home  market, which  implies  that PF is fixed ex ante 
17. Specifically,  in Obstfeld's  framework  there is unit elasticity  of substitution. 266  ENGEL 
in the foreign currency. The home-currency price, PF =  SPF,  changes with 
the exchange  rate. 
Under flexible nominal prices, using the general model of Section 2, we 
find 
PH _  PH _  1 
PF  PFT 
(Here, an increase in qr  represents an increase in home labor supply, which 
would  reduce  the wage  and  cost  per unit  of  the home  product  under 
flexible prices and wages.) 
With fixed nominal  wages,  we  have for example  in the home  country 
PH/PF  =  PH/SPF.  Since  PH and  PF will  be  fixed  under  the  market  condi- 
tions described,  we  need  exchange-rate  flexibility  to allow  relative price 
adjustment.  Indeed,  since  S  =  M/M*,  with  a suitably  designed  mone- 
tary policy  of the form M  =  krl and M* =  k*ql*  the flexible  price equi- 
librium can be mimicked.  Indeed, Obstfeld demonstrates  that prices and 
allocations  are the  same  under  flexible  prices  as under  sticky  nominal 
wages  with  this inward-looking  monetary policy  that has exchange-rate 
flexibility.18 
OR (2000) present evidence  that shows there is much more passthrough 
of exchange rates to imported-goods  prices than to final-consumer prices. 
While  the  passthrough  is  certainly  not  100% (as in the  model  just de- 
scribed), there appears to be a sufficient degree  of passthrough  to allow 
for a significant  expenditure-switching  effect  following  from  nominal- 
exchange-rate  changes.  Goldberg  and Knetter (1997) and Goldberg  and 
Campa  (2001) offer evidence  that while  passthrough  to import prices is 
far from complete,  it is significantly  greater than passthrough  to final- 
consumer  prices. 
An important aspect of the Obstfeld (2001) model  is the idea that there 
are final-goods  producers  or distributors who  can substitute between  lo- 
cally produced  and imported  intermediates.  Devereux,  Engel, and Tille 
(1999) take an approach that is quite similar to Obstfeld (2001). However, 
they take the limiting  case of the cost function in which  the elasticity of 
substitution is zero. That is, their model can be interpreted as one in which 
the distributor combines  imported  goods  and locally produced  goods  in 
fixed proportion.l9 In that case, of course, there is no possibility  of substi- 
18. In fact, in terms of real variables and prices of output,  the model  is isomorphic  to the 
PCP model  of OR (2000a). 
19. That is not exactly the set-up in Devereux,  Engel, and Tille, but there is little difference 
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tution between  imported  goods  and local goods  when  the exchange  rate 
changes, even though  there is complete passthrough  of the exchange rate 
to imported  prices. 
Potentially  there are wealth  effects from exchange-rate  changes  in this 
case. The demand  for imported goods  is fixed, because their price is fixed 
in consumers'  currencies and the distributor cannot substitute toward lo- 
cally produced  goods.  When the home  currency depreciates, it raises the 
price that local distributors must pay for imported goods and lowers their 
profits. Foreign distributors have a windfall  gain. In Devereux, Engel, and 
Tille (1999), these profit effects are not consequential,  because of their as- 
sumption  that there are state-contingent  nominal  bonds  traded for each 
possible  state. But Tille (2000) investigates  the importance of these wealth 
effects  for equilibrium  demands  when  only  non-state-contingent  bonds 
can be  traded.  These  wealth  effects  are a completely  different  channel 
through  which  exchange  rates affect equilibrium  than the relative price 
effects that are so important to the Friedman analysis. 
The model of Devereux,  Engel, and Tille (1999) is best described as one 
in which  imports are primarily branded final goods.  The distributor can- 
not  substitute  any  local product  for that brand.  For example,  a Toyota 
dealer cannot substitute  a Chevrolet  Lumina for a Camry if the yen be- 
comes  too expensive.  The Obstfeld  (2001) model  is best thought  of as a 
model  in which  the consumer cannot differentiate between  local and im- 
ported sources of inputs. Perhaps the typical product in this setup is auto 
parts. The automobile  may itself be assembled  in the country in which  it 
is consumed  (in fact, many Toyota Camrys purchased in the United States 
are manufactured  there), but using  parts that may  be imported  or pro- 
duced  locally. 
The empirical  question  is to what  extent  substitution  occurs at some 
stage before the good reaches the consumer. For the question of exchange- 
rate flexibility,  the  key  is  whether  substitution  can  occur between  im- 
ported  and  local  products.  For  example,  if  the  United  Kingdom  is 
considering  adopting  the  euro  vs.  keeping  an independent  pound,  the 
question  is whether  in response  to a pound  depreciation  the British can 
substitute  toward  British goods.  Let me clarify what  this means by way 
of an example. Suppose the imported good is wine. If the euro appreciates 
relative  to the pound  and  dollar and thereby  raises the pound  price of 
French wine (as in the PCP specification), then the British might substitute 
away  from French wine  toward  American  wine.  But for that margin  of 
substitution,  the flexibility of the pound-euro  rate does not matter at all. 
Even if the pound-euro  rate were  fixed, the price of French wine  would 
rise relative to that of American wine. The question is the degree to which 
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produced  on the continent  toward  U.K.-produced  goods.  If a large de- 
gree  of such  substitution  occurs (as in the Obstfeld  (2001) model),  then 
exchange-rate  flexibility is desirable. If little such substitution  occurs (as 
in Devereux,  Engel, and Tille (1999)), then there is not  so strong a case 
for an independent  currency with  freely floating rates. 
10. Conclusions 
The famous case for flexible exchange rates advanced by Friedman (1953) 
is based  on a view  that appears at odds  with  empirical evidence.  Fried- 
man's approach assumes that nominal prices are set in producers' curren- 
cies  and  exchange-rate  changes  are passed  through  completely  to final 
users of the goods. Thus an exchange-rate change delivers a relative price 
adjustment between  foreign and domestically  produced  goods. 
Recent theoretical papers confirm Friedman's policy prescription under 
his assumption about goods pricing. Empirical evidence, however, appears 
to contradict this assumption,  because  consumer  prices are not very res- 
ponsive  to exchange rates. If there is no effect of exchange rates on prices 
that are paid by demanders of goods, then the exchange rate does not play 
the role in adjusting relative prices that Friedman posits.  The jury is still 
out on whether we can reconcile the evidence  of low exchange-rate pass- 
through to consumer prices with a significant expenditure-switching  effect. 
Even for advanced  countries that have credible monetary policies  and 
stable financial markets, expenditure  switching  is only one of several fac- 
tors that are important  in the  choice  of  fixed vs.  floating.  As  has been 
noted, one traditional argument in favor of floating exchange rates is that 
countries  are able  to  follow  independent  monetary  policies  that allow 
monetary  policy  to react to local conditions.  In the model  of Devereux 
and  Engel  (2001), independent  monetary  policies  are  strictly  subopti- 
mal-they  lead to undesirable  deviations  from LOOP, and do not yield 
any gains. But the structure of their model  rules out possible  gains from 
monetary policy, because it assumes  a full set of nominal state-contingent 
claims, identical preferences  for home  and foreign households,  and that 
all goods  are traded. 
On the other hand, there is evidence  that fixed exchange  rates, or cur- 
rency unions, confer gains that are not addressed in the models  discussed 
here. Rose  (2000) and  Frankel and  Rose  (2002) find  empirical  evidence 
that joining  currency unions  will  increase the volume  of trade between 
union members, and the increased trade will stimulate growth. These pa- 
pers do not explain why  currency unions increase trade, but presumably 
the unions somehow  foster more tightly integrated markets. Indeed, Pars- 
ley and Wei (2001b), Rogers (2001), and GV (2001b) find that deviations Expenditure  Switching  and Exchange-Rate  Policy  ?  269 
from LOOP are small  for currency-union  members-even  smaller  than 
for countries  that have  fixed  exchange  rates but  separate currencies. So 
the choice  of exchange-rate  regime,  and particularly the choice to join a 
currency union,  might  influence  how  prices are set. 
The models  discussed  here assume  that the exchange  rate is driven by 
monetary  and real factors, and there is no significant role for speculative 
bubbles. If bubbles are important in determining exchange rates, then per- 
haps  a stronger  case for fixed  exchange  rates or currency union  can be 
made. Jeanne and Rose (2002) advance the view  that fixed exchange rates 
are desirable on the grounds  that they help reduce the role of pure noise 
in exchange  rates. 
Missing from my survey of empirical work has been evidence  concern- 
ing quantities: trade flows  or employment,  for example.  Integrating such 
evidence  is important, but beyond  the scope of this paper. Microeconomic 
studies  that examine  how  imports  of particular types  of goods,  or how 
employment  in  specific  industries,  are  affected  by  changes  in  import 
prices must be applied  with  a dollop  of caution. That is because  there is 
a missing  link that must be supplied  before one can use these studies  to 
judge the quantitative significance of the expenditure-switching  effect: the 
degree of passthrough.  Import demand  may be fairly elastic with respect 
to price changes,  but if the import  price is inelastic  with  respect  to the 
nominal exchange rate, the overall effect on import demand may be small. 
Aggregate  studies  that link employment  or aggregate  imports  or sec- 
toral employment  to real exchange  rates suffer less  from this problem, 
because  we  know  that  for  advanced  countries  the  real  exchange  rate 
moves  closely  with  the  nominal  exchange  rate. Hooper,  Johnson,  and 
Marquez (2000) estimate  short-run aggregate  import and export elastici- 
ties for the G-7 countries. They find these elasticities are uniformly  small, 
and  generally  statistically  indistinguishable  from  zero.  They  conclude, 
"The evidence  suggests  that ...  changes  in relative prices play  a lesser 
role as a short-run international conduit." 
On the other hand, studies  of the effects of real exchange  rates on em- 
ployment,  such  as  Gourinchas  (1998,  1999)  and  Goldberg  and  Tracy 
(2000), do find statistically significant effects. It is difficult to judge, how- 
ever,  the  economic  significance  of  their findings  for the  importance  of 
the expenditure-switching  effect without  placing  them  in the context of 
a general  equilibrium  model.  For example,  Gourinchas  (1998) finds  "an 
average  0.27% contraction  in  tradable employment  over  the 3 quarters 
following  a mild 10% appreciation of the real exchange rate." Gourinchas 
(1999) finds  "a 1 percent appreciation  of the real exchange  rate destroys 
0.95 percent  of tradable jobs over  the next  two  years." It is  difficult  to 
judge whether such changes imply that nominal-exchange-rate  flexibility 270  ENGEL 
has  large or small  effects  on welfare  unless  these  findings  can be  inte- 
grated into a full general equilibrium  model. 
The new open-economy  macroeconomics has given us a structured way 
to think about the issues  that are important when  considering  the desir- 
ability of floating  exchange  rates vs.  currency union.  Unfortunately  for 
policymakers  facing a near-term deadline  for choosing  an exchange-rate 
system,  our knowledge  has not advanced  far enough  to offer a firm rec- 
ommendation  backed up by appropriate theory. 
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change  rates. Friedman argued  that when  prices  are sticky, floating  ex- 
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exchange-rate  changes  are passed  through into imported-goods  prices in 
domestic  currencies. After describing this result, Engel examines  the cur- 
rent  empirical  literature  on  real-exchange-rate  behavior.  The  evidence 
suggests  that domestic  prices are rather unresponsive  to exchange  rates. 
Engel  argues  that fixed, not  flexible,  exchange  rates are optimal  in this 
case. Engel also looks at other explanations  for the insensitivity  of domes- 
tic  prices  to  exchange-rate  changes  and  concludes  that  more  research 
needs  to be done  to arrive at a definitive  answer. 
As a status report on the literature, this paper fills an important niche 
in emphasizing  what  we  have  learned  so  far. However,  the paper  also 
highlights  some issues  that remain on the table to understand  the signifi- 
cance of both the specific arguments  in the paper and how  they bear on 
the literature as a whole.  Some  of these  issues  are described  by  Engel. 
Therefore, I focus below on some of the issues not mentioned  in the paper. 
I divide  my comments  into two broad categories: first, issues arising from 
the argument  in the paper itself; and second,  issues  that remain for the 
literature to confront in the future. 
2. Issues  Arising  from the Paper 
The basic premise  of this paper is derived  in Devereux  and Engel (2001). 
The model  is a new-open-economy  macro  model  with  two  countries popu- 
lated by monopolistic  competitors facing constant markups and represen- 
tative  consumers.  In the basic  model,  consumers  have  the same  utility 
function, although generalizations  are described later in the paper. Impor- 
tantly, markets are incomplete,  so that agents cannot undo  the effects of 
sticky  prices,  a critical factor in  Friedman's  case  for floating  exchange 
rates. The nature  of market incompleteness  assumed  here is that state- 
contingent  assets have nominal, not real, payouts.  This assumption  turns 
out to be key to the welfare  implications,  as I describe below. 
With  this  model,  Engel  examines  three  regimes  with  different  ex- 
change-rate passthrough  assumptions.  First, it is assumed  that prices are 
completely  flexible.  In this case, it is shown  that whether  the exchange 
rate is fixed or flexible, the constrained optimum  can be achieved.  In this 
optimum,  relative prices of home  to foreign goods  are equal to the ratio 
of endowment  supplies,  so that 
PH/PF  =  PH/PF  =  1*/r1.  (1) 
The second regime Engel examines is the producer  currency  pricing (PCP) 
regime,  in which  there is  100% passthrough.  The price is set in the ex- 
porting country's currency, and under floating exchange rates any change 274 . LEWIS 
in exchange  rates is completely  passed  through  into changes  in the im- 
porting  country's  price of the imported  good.  Purchasing-power  parity 
(PPP) holds  for each individual  good.  In this case, the same constrained 
optimum  can be achieved,  since relative prices change with the exchange 
rate. It is this channel that generates the optimum  under both the flexible 
goods  and  the PCP case. This is a version  of Friedman's  argument  for 
flexible exchange  rates under sticky prices. 
This result is reversed in the third case Engel examines, however. Under 
local currency  pricing (LCP) the price is set in the importing country's cur- 
rency. In this case, there is no passthrough.  Since prices are unrelated to 
exchange-rate  movements,  there is no  adjustment  to changes  in  goods 
supplies  even  under flexible exchange  rates. Therefore, it is not possible 
to achieve the constrained optimum. In fact, Engel argues that the optimal 
policy  is to fix the exchange  rate at the level  implied  by PPP. 
The intuition  for this result illustrates why  the asset-markets assump- 
tion is so critical when  there is no passthrough  (LCP). First, the channel 
for relative prices to respond to real shocks is missing.  Therefore, relative 
prices do not attain the constrained  optimum,  so that equation  (1) does 
not hold,  even  under floating exchange  rates. 
Second, since PPP does  not hold  and since contingent  claims pay  out 
in nominal (not real) contracts, there is an additional  source of distortion. 
In  particular,  nominal  contingent  contracts  imply  that  asset  markets 
achieve  the following  first-order condition: 
U'(C)/P  =  U'(C)*  / SP*,  (2) 
where  U'(C) [U'(C)*]  is the marginal utility of consumption  to the domes- 
tic [foreign] consumer,  and P, P*, and  S are the domestic  price, foreign 
price, and nominal exchange rate, respectively. As is well known, the stan- 
dard complete-markets  optimum  would  generate1 
U'(C)=  U'(C)*.  (3) 
Therefore, asset markets would  achieve  optimal risk sharing only if P = 
SP*, since in this case the asset-market condition  (2) also generates (3). In 
other words,  the risk-sharing optimum  holds  only if PPP holds. 
This distortion  does  not arise in the 100%-passthrough (PCP) regime, 
1. In the standard  model  with  isoelastic  utility,  the growth  rates of marginal  utilities  are 
equalized.  In  this  simple  single-period  model,  parameters  are  normalized  so  that 
marginal-utility  levels  are equalized. Comment  *  275 
since  PPP holds,  resulting  in  the  risk-sharing  optimum  automatically. 
However,  in the no-passthrough  (LCP) regime with  nominal  contingent 
contracts, there is an additional lack of risk-sharing distortion arising from 
deviations  from PPP. In fact, in this regime  the optimal policy  is to give 
up  on  responding  to supply  shocks  and  instead  target risk sharing  by 
fixing the exchange  rate at the level  that will  imply  PPP. 
While  this policy  is the best the authorities  can accomplish  under  no 
passthrough  (LCP), it is still Pareto-inferior to the optimum  under  100% 
passthrough  (PCP), since the economy  is still left with  the relative price 
distortion  under no passthrough. 
Given  this  background,  I now  describe  questions  arising  from  the 
argument. 
2.1 WHAT  TYPE  OF ASSET  MARKETS  ARE  THESE? 
As explained  above, the nature of the welfare hierarchy of the exchange- 
rate policies  in the presence  of different  degrees  of exchange-rate  pass- 
through depends  critically on the asset-market structure. However,  there 
is little motivation  for this market. Why are there state-contingent  claims 
in nominal,  but not real, payoffs?  Many critics of the complete-markets 
assumption  focus upon the state-contingent  nature of the payoffs. Recent 
studies  find that only a small proportion of risks measured by consump- 
tion  outcomes  are spanned  by  financial  returns.2 Given  the  substantial 
stickiness of prices documented  by Engel, it seems unlikely that adjusting 
by the nominal  price levels  would  affect this result. By contrast, it could 
be argued that liquid markets exist for real-index bonds  for which  assets 
pay out in real terms. Another approach that has been taken in the litera- 
ture is to assume  that state-contingent  assets do not trade at all, but that 
risk-free bonds  can be used  to smooth  consumption  intertemporally.3 It 
would  be  interesting  to see  how  these  more  conventional  assumptions 
about incomplete  markets would  affect the results from the analysis. 
Whatever the result, it is clear that the assumed  asset structure is key 
to the outcome  in the paper. Therefore, it deserves  more discussion.  Why 
can't people  trade at least some assets with real payouts  if they can trade 
in what would  seem like much more complex  asset markets that pay off 
nominal  returns in all states? What kind of market is this, and where  do 
we  see examples  in the real world? How  robust are the implications  for 
fixed vs. floating  exchange  rates to the specific assumptions  of the form 
of market incompleteness? 
2. See for example  Davis,  Nalewaik,  and Willen  (2000). 
3. See Heaton  and Lucas (1995, 1996), and Baxter and Crucini (1995), to name  a few. 276 *  LEWIS 
2.2 HOW IMPORTANT  QUANTITATIVELY  ARE 
THESE  INEFFICIENCIES? 
Taking the  asset  market structure as given,  the other question  lurking 
behind  the welfare  hierarchy is: "How big are the welfare  distortions?" 
Recall that  under  100% passthrough  the  constrained  optimum  can be 
achieved where two potential distortions can be eliminated: (a) misalloca- 
tion of relative goods  supplies,  and (b) inefficient sharing of risks across 
countries. Under the no-passthrough  (LCP) regime, only the risk-sharing 
inefficiency (b) can be eliminated. Therefore, the obvious  question is: how 
large is this inefficiency  (b) compared  to the inefficiency  (a)? 
If risk-sharing welfare costs (b) are large and the supply  allocation wel- 
fare costs  (a) are small, then it would  seem  that the difference between 
the optimal exchange-rate regimes under no passthrough  and 100%  pass- 
through would  not be very great. Under no passthrough  (LCP), the econ- 
omy would  be left with a small resource-allocation  distortion after fixing 
exchange  rates, but in either case, the risk-sharing costs  are eliminated. 
This would  imply that the welfare costs of having no passthrough  are not 
large. 
On  the  other  hand,  if risk-sharing  welfare  costs  (b) are significantly 
smaller than supply  allocation costs (a), then there is a significant welfare 
loss  under  fixed  exchange  rates arising  from  the exporters'  practice of 
fixing prices  in local currencies  and not passing  through  exchange-rate 
changes.  In this case, the choice of exchange-rate regime would  be a less 
important policy issue than this practice by exporters and importers. This 
is because,  whether  exchange  rates are fixed or floating, there is a large 
welfare  loss  from  supply  misallocation  (a) that arises  purely  from the 
practice of not passing exchange-rate changes through to exporting prices. 
Therefore, a more important policy  might be to encourage exporters and 
importers to pass exchange-rate changes through to local-currency prices, 
thereby getting  the economy  closer to a constrained  optimum. 
As this discussion  makes clear, without  some quantification, we cannot 
know  how  critical the degree  of exchange-rate  passthrough  is to Fried- 
man's argument  for fixed vs. floating exchange  rates. 
2.3 IS THE  FOCUS  UPON THE  FRIEDMAN  ARGUMENT  FOR 
FLOATING  RATES  TOO  NARROW? 
In this  paper,  Engel  asks  what  this  version  of  the new  open-economy 
model has to say about Friedman's argument for floating exchange rates. 
Given the discussion  above, it is clear that this leads to an argument not 
for fixed  exchange  rates necessarily,  but  for a PPP rule. Moreover,  the 
rationale behind  this PPP rule in the model  is expressly  to eliminate  a 
distortion  of international risk sharing. Comment - 277 
On the other hand,  countries  that have  adopted  a PPP exchange-rate 
rule, such as Latin American countries and Israel, do not appear to have 
had international risk sharing as a major policy objective. Rather, the PPP 
rule seems to coincide with announced  concerns about reducing inflation 
and generating  credibility  in financial markets. 
Thus, it appears that by choosing  to focus upon Friedman's argument, 
Engel has narrowed  the discussion  of fixed vs. floating rates to risk shar- 
ing. This particular consideration  does not seem to be a major concern to 
policymakers  faced with  this decision,  however. 
3.  Issues Ahead  for the Literature 
Above,  I have  restricted my comments  to the specifics  of the model  and 
empirical  evidence  outlined  by Engel in his paper. In this section,  I de- 
scribe some  issues  that lie ahead for the literature to confront if the new 
open-economy  model  is  to be  used  to  make  welfare  statements  about 
Friedman's argument  for fixed vs. floating rates. 
3.1 HOMOGENEOUS  PASSTHROUGH  ACROSS  INDUSTRIES 
The model  described  in the paper relies upon  fixed markups  and pass- 
through  across industries  at the aggregate  economy  level.  However,  the 
empirical  evidence  on  passthrough  has  found  both  assumptions  to be 
counterfactual at the industry level. For example, Knetter (1993) finds sig- 
nificant  differences  in markups  across  industries.  In fact, he  finds  that 
there is greater variation in markups across industries  than across coun- 
tries. Furthermore, Bodnar, Dumas, and Marston (2002) examine a duop- 
oly  model  of  domestic  and  foreign  exporters  in  Japan  in  which  the 
markups not only are time-varying,  but depend  upon the exchange  rate. 
Table 1 reproduces  some  of the estimates  of passthrough  across indus- 
Table 1  PASSTHROUGH  ESTIMATES  BY 
INDUSTRY  FROM  BODNAR,  DUMAS, 
AND MARSTON  (2002) 
Industry  Passthrough  coefficient 
Construction  machinery  0.806 
Measuring  equipment  0.750 
Camera  0.471 
Copies  0.294 
Motor vehicles  0.262 
Electronic  parts  0.244 
Magnetic  recording  0.218 
Film  0.148 278 *  LEWIS 
Figure 1 MOTOR  VEHICLE  PRICES  IN YEN 
--  Export  Price 
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tries. The passthrough  coefficients  of exchange  rates to Japanese export 
goods  differ from about 81% for construction machinery to about 15%  for 
film.  To  illustrate  the  relationship  between  the  domestic  and  foreign 
prices, Figures 1 and 2 show the domestic price index and the export price 
index, both in Japanese yen, for motor vehicles and cameras, respectively.4 
While these figures are not the most extreme differences  in passthrough 
shown  in Table 1, there are clearly differences in the amount of variability 
in the deviations  from the law of one price in these goods. 
Thus, before the model outlined in the paper can be used to make policy 
statements  that hinge  critically on the degree  of passthrough,  more re- 
search  must  be  done  to  understand  the  behavior  of  aggregate  pass- 
through.  In particular,  the  literature  must  tackle  the  question  of  how 
differences in markups and / or passthrough at the industry level (perhaps 
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even the firm level) aggregate up to the macroeconomic response of goods 
pricing. 
3.2 CONSTANT  PASSTHROUGH  OVER  TIME 
In the literature, a standard  assumption  is that passthrough  is constant 
over time. Accordingly,  in the paper by Engel, passthrough  is either 100% 
or zero all the time, although  these extremes are clearly meant as bench- 
mark assumptions.  While  this assumption  makes  for tractable analysis 
and results, it is at odds  with  standard business  practice. Companies  in- 
volved  in international trade differ in their approaches  to exchange-rate 
risk, but most international financial officers claim to use a variety of strat- 
egies to manage this risk. These strategies include a combination of hedg- 
ing  the risk with  financial instruments  and adjusting  the local-currency 
price as the exchange  rate changes. 
Some  evidence  on these business  practices is provided  in a survey  of 
399 firms' use  of derivatives  (Bodnar, Marston, and Hayt  (1998). These 
firms were  from diverse  industries  coming  from three different sectors: 
primary  products,  manufacturing,  and  services.  Moreover,  the  firms 
ranged from small (sales less than $150 million) to large (sales more than 
$1.2 billion).  Of the large firms, 83% responded  that they used  financial 
derivatives  to hedge  risk; of the medium-sized  firms, 45%; of the small 
firms, 12%.  This suggests  that much of the international trade transactions 
at the macro level  in the United  States is hedged  to some  degree  with 
derivatives. 
What  does  hedging  have  to  do  with  passthrough?  Financial  officers 
suggest  that they  often view  hedging  and adjusting their local-currency 
price as substitute strategies for protecting profits from adverse exchange- 
rate changes. When profits are protected from exchange-rate movements 
by existing  hedges,  exporters feel less need  to adjust prices in local cur- 
rency and tend not to pass through exchange-rate changes.  On the other 
hand,  when  there  are no  hedges  or existing  hedges  have  expired,  ex- 
change-rate movements  are felt more directly in profit lines and there is 
a more immediate  need  to consider  a price change. 
On this issue, the survey by Bodnar, Marston, and Hayt (1998) is again 
illuminating.  Of the firms that use derivatives to hedge currency risk, 85% 
replied  that they  hedged  anticipated  transactions  less  than a year, and 
only 57% said that they hedge  anticipated transactions more than a year. 
This evidence  is consistent  with  anecdotal  evidence  that suggests  firms 
hedge  short-term  exposures  more  actively  than longer-term  exposures. 
Moreover,  60% of the firms said that while  they faced foreign-exchange 
exposure,  the net exposure  was  only plus  or minus  5% of net revenues. 280 *  LEWIS 
This suggests  that many  firms have  multiple  exposures  so that they are 
operationally  hedged. 
If firms are hedged  with either derivatives  or a mix of operations, then 
it is likely  that many  international  financial  officers  do  not  alter local- 
currency  prices  in  the near  term. Therefore, short-term  passthrough  is 
likely  to be  low.  However,  as hedging  instruments  expire,  these  same 
international officers are forced to pass through the changes  at least par- 
tially in order to preserve profit lines. Clearly, the degree of competition 
and the mix of operations  are key factors in this decision. 
Overall,  it  is  difficult  to  envision  a  model  that  brings  empirics  on 
exchange-rate passthrough  together with welfare  analysis  of Friedman's 
argument  for fixed exchange  rates without  considering  the passthrough 
decision  as an endogenous  variable to the firm. 
4.  Conclusions 
This paper is an insightful  survey of what the new-open-economy  macro 
literature and empirical evidence  on the real exchange  rate jointly have 
to say about Friedman's argument  for fixed vs.  floating  exchange  rates. 
It should  be useful  to any researcher who  wants  to learn more about the 
area. 
At the same time, I was  left with  the wish  list of research items posed 
above.  This list includes:  (1) quantifying  the importance  of the welfare 
costs; and (2) analyzing the robustness of the results to (a) the asset market 
assumptions  and  (b) heterogeneity  and  time  variation  in  passthrough 
across industries.  I look forward to reading about such further research. 
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1. Introduction 
It is a pleasure  to discuss  this paper by Charles Engel. In recent years, 
Engel  has  been  a  major contributor  to  the  new-open-economy  macro 
(NOEM)  literature.  This  literature,  pioneered  by  Obstfeld  and  Rogoff 
(1995), aims to build models  of the open economy  in the New  Keynesian 
tradition while retaining solid micro foundations  and a rigorous intertem- 
poral approach. Engel's empirical and theoretical papers have shaped and 
greatly influenced  the direction that this research has taken. 
This paper offers two contributions. The first part is a survey of recent 
developments  in  the  literature, both  theoretical  and  empirical.  This  is 
most welcome.  The field  is starting to look a lot like a restaurant menu 
with  150 different entrees, all made  from the same 20 basic ingredients. 
In the end, and without  a little clarification for the layman inside all of us, 
they all taste the same. The second  part of the paper provides  additional 
empirical evidence that prices are sticky in consumers' currency, evidence 
that is used  to discriminate  further between  alternative models. 
I like the first part. I am somewhat  less convinced  by the second  one, 
as my comments  will  now  explain. 
2. A (Selective)  Review  of the Literature:  What  We 
Have  Learned 
A key issue  is the impact of exchange-rate movements  on relative prices 
and quantities. In the traditional Mundell-Fleming  framework, domestic- 
currency prices of domestically  produced  goods  are given,  and the pass- 
through  from exchange  rates to prices is unitary. A depreciation  of the 
domestic  currency lowers the price of exports in the foreign currency and 
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increases the price of imports in the domestic currency. This relative-price 
change  affects  the  allocation  of  expenditure-the  expenditure-switching 
mechanism-which  is at the heart of the adjustment process and is the key 
to the potency  of monetary  policy  under flexible exchange  rates. 
2.1 EARLY  NEW OPEN-ECONOMY  MODELS:  PRODUCER 
CURRENCY  PRICING 
The early NOEM models  of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, 1998, 2000, 2002) 
have  incorporated  this mechanism  by  assuming  that prices are fixed in 
the currency of the producer (producer  currency  pricing, or PCP). Not sur- 
prisingly,  perhaps,  these  models  retain the  flavor of  the  old  Mundell- 
Fleming  framework.  In contrast,  though,  one  can  now  ask  normative 
questions  such  as  (1) "What are the optimal  exchange-rate  regime  and 
monetary  policy?" and  (2) "Should there be monetary  cooperation?" In 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002), the answers  are (1) to float, and to set mone- 
tary policy  to respond  to domestic  real shocks  only,  and (2) no. 
This paper provides  a nice intuition for these results: under a complete 
set of nominal claims, the marginal utility of a unit of domestic currency is 
proportional between  domestic  and foreign consumers.  Full insurance- 
equating  marginal utilities-requires  that PPP hold. This happens  when 
the exchange  rate is flexible. On the other hand, country-specific  shocks 
require an adjustment  in relative  prices.  When  prices  are sticky  in the 
producer's currency, this is achieved by a flexible exchange rate, provided 
monetary  policy  targets  domestic  real shocks.  This is  the  rationale  for 
flexible  exchange  rates in Mundell's  classical  analysis  of optimum  cur- 
rency areas, and this also underlies  Friedman's celebrated argument  for 
flexible exchange rates. In the Obstfeld-Rogoff  setup, therefore, Friedman 
meets  Mundell,  and they both  conclude  that flexible  exchange  rates do 
the trick. Together with  an appropriately  chosen  monetary  policy  (one 
that focuses exclusively  on the task at hand, i.e. stabilizing domestic  fluc- 
tuations), this implements  the constrained Pareto-efficient allocation and 
replicates the flexible price allocation. 
It is useful  to note  that this result does  not depend  too much  on the 
assumption  that markets for nominal contingent  claims are complete. In- 
deed,  as Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002) have shown,  even when  markets are 
incomplete,  the gains  from cooperation  are likely to be very small com- 
pared to the potential  gains from stabilization  of domestic  disturbances. 
This is so because  in this class of models  the welfare gains from interna- 
tional risk sharing are not very large. 
2.2  BUT THE LAW OF ONE PRICE DOES NOT HOLD 
So, what more could we  ask for? 
Well, it turns out that a critical assumption  in this class of models  is the Comment 283 
PCP assumption  and the associated expenditure-switching  mechanism. In 
its simplest  form, it implies  that the law  of one price  (LOOP) holds  for 
consumer  prices.  Yet, as  Engel  and  others  demonstrated  in  a series  of 
very influential papers  (Engel, 1993, 1999; Engel and Rogers, 1996, 2001; 
Parsley and Wei, 2001), and as he shows anew in this paper (see his Figure 
1), domestic  and foreign consumer markets are very segmented.  Put sim- 
ply,  LOOP does  not hold,  and the passthrough  to retail prices is closer 
to zero  than to one. Engel  (1999) demonstrates  an even  stronger result. 
He decomposes  movements  in the CPI real exchange rate into two compo- 
nents  (up to some  empirically  small covariance  term): the relative price 
of traded goods,  and a weighted  difference of the relative price of traded 
to  nontraded  goods  at home  and  abroad.  Under  standard  theories  of 
exchange-rate  determination,  tradable  goods  satisfy  LOOP, so  move- 
ments  in the real exchange  rate should  be accounted  for by fluctuations 
in the relative price of traded to nontraded  goods  at home  and abroad. 
Yet, Engel finds that up to 90% of the variability in real exchange  rates, 
even  at long  horizons,  is explained  instead by deviations  from LOOP. 
This result is consistent  with  a combination  of two assumptions.  First, 
firms can price-discriminate  across markets (price to market,  or PTM). Sec- 
ond, they set prices in advance in local currency (local currency  pricing, or 
LCP). As Devereux  and Engel (1998) and this paper show,  these assump- 
tions  deliver  starkly different results. Since prices are now  sticky in the 
importer's  currency,  relative-price  adjustments  do  not  take place,  even 
with  a flexible  exchange  rate. A flexible exchange  rate just causes  profit 
risk for exporters. A fixed exchange  rate is therefore the optimal  policy. 
In this  framework,  both  Mundell  and  Friedman are wrong,  the former 
because  there is no expenditure-switching  effect, the latter because there 
are no relative-price  adjustments. 
2.3 YET  THERE  IS EVIDENCE  OF EXPENDITURE  SWITCHING 
Given  the  extensive  evidence  of  the  failures  of  LOOP, is  the  debate 
settled? 
Not  quite. Obstfeld  and Rogoff  (2000) and Obstfeld  (2001) show  that 
the LCP assumption  has some  implications  for the comovements  of the 
terms  of  trades  and  the  nominal  exchange  rate  that  are  rejected  by 
the  data.  Suppose,  as Devereux  and  Engel  do,  that prices  are fixed  in 
the importer's currency. Denote  the domestic  currency price of imported 
foreign goods by PF. Denote the foreign currency price of exported domes- 
tic goods  by PH.  Both are fixed. The terms of trade, the relative price of 
home  imports  in terms of home  exports,  is simply  PF/?PH, where  ? de- 
notes the nominal exchange rate quoted as units of domestic currency per 
unit  of  foreign  currency.  Under  LCP, a currency  depreciation-an  in- 
crease in ?-improves  the terms of trade. 284  GOURINCHAS 
Conversely,  under  PCP, the domestic  price of imports,  PF =  EPF,  in- 
creases one for one with  the exchange  rate, while  the domestic-currency 
price of  domestic  exports,  PH, remains  unchanged.  Hence  the  terms  of 
trade are ePF*/PH and deteriorate  with  a currency depreciation. 
As Obstfeld and Rogoff show,  terms-of-trade deteriorations are, if any- 
thing,  positively  correlated  with  nominal-exchange-rate  depreciations. 
Figures 1 and 2 report scatterplots of the 12-month change in the relative 
price of exports-a  proxy for PF/PH-against  the 12-month change in the 
nominal exchange rate for Japan and Germany against the United States. 
The correlation is positive  and very  high  in both  cases  (0.86 for Japan- 
U.S. and 0.95 for Germany-U.S.),  indicating  substantial  deterioration  in 
the terms of trade when  the currency depreciates. 
As  Obstfeld  (2001, p.  19) argues,  "because  the  ultimate  consumer  is 
several steps removed  from the port of entry of import goods,  however, 
findings such as Engel's (1999) have only an indirect bearing on the height 
of barriers to international trade between  firms, which  accounts for most 
of  international  trade." Indeed,  empirical  studies  of  passthrough  sur- 
veyed  in Goldberg  and Knetter (1997) indicate  substantial but not 100% 
passthrough  at the firm level. 
To summarize,  the overwhelming  evidence  assembled by Engel in this 
Figure 1 YEN-DOLLAR  RELATIVE  EXPORT  PRICES  VS. NOMINAL 
EXCHANGE  RATE  (12-MONTH  PERCENTAGE  CHANGE), 
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Figure  2 DEUTSCHE-MARK-DOLLAR  RELATIVE  EXPORT  PRICE  VS. 
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and  previous  papers  indicates  that  consumer  markets  are  very  seg- 
mented,  even for tradable goods.  Yet terms of trade and export prices do 
respond to exchange rates. This opens up the possibility  that expenditure- 
switching  channels are present at the importer level, yet do not affect the 
consumer  level  much. 
3. What  Should  Come  Next 
What  can  account  for  the  different  behavior  of  import  and  consumer 
prices? The paper  considers  three possibilities.  First, trading  costs  may 
lead domestic  consumers to substitute for domestic alternatives (Obstfeld 
and Rogoff, 2000). If so, the share of foreign goods  in the price index may 
be  small,  and  fluctuations  in  the exchange  rate may  not  affect the CPI 
much. Second, deviations  of LOOP could  arise from the nontraded  com- 
ponent in each traded good-local  production and distribution costs such 
as rent, advertising,  etc. (McCallum and Nelson,  2000; Burstein, Neves, 
and Rabelo, 2000). Lastly, intermediate inputs represent the bulk of inter- 
national trade between  developed  economies.  If domestic  and foreign in- 
termediates  are substitutes,  a fluctuation  in the exchange  rate may  not 
affect the overall CPI much, even  with  a high passthrough  at the import 
level  (Obstfeld, 2001). 
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The substantive  part of the paper considers  all three alternatives  and 
argues that explanations  based on trading costs and on nontradable ser- 
vices  and distribution  do not hold  up to the data. Before I comment  on 
this  part, it is  important  to log  a few  remarks on  the  general  research 
agenda. 
3.1 INVOICING:  PRACTICE  AND THEORY 
Clearly, price discrimination  and invoicing  practices can have a large ef- 
fect on the transmission  mechanism  and optimal  monetary  policy.  This 
raises two questions,  one positive  and one normative: What do we know 
about invoicing  practices? In which  currency should  exporters set their 
prices? 
3.1.1 Invoicing in Practice  The empirical evidence  is sparse. Obstfeld and 
Rogoff  (2000), as well  as most  of the literature, refer to a 1995 Institute 
study  concluding  that most  exports  tend to be invoiced  in the currency 
of  the  exporter.  There is  one  notable  exception:  exports  to  the  United 
States are generally  invoiced  in dollars. 
Table 1 reports some more recent evidence  on the currency of denomi- 
nation of exports and imports of some  industrialized  countries between 
1992 and  1996, from Tavlas  (1997). The U.S. special  status is still there: 
Table 1  CURRENCY  DENOMINATION  OF SELECTED 
INDUSTRIAL  COUNTRIES,  1992-1996 
Fraction  (%) 
Country  U.S. Dollar  DM  Yen 
Exports 
United  States  98.0  0.4  0.4 
Germany  9.8  76.4  0.6 
Japan  52.7  35.7 
United Kingdom  22.0  5.0  0.7 
France  18.6  10.6  1.0 
Italy  23.0  18.0 
Imports 
United  States  88.8  3.2  3.1 
Germany  18.1  53.3  1.5 
Japan  70.4  2.8  22.5 
United Kingdom  22.0  11.9  2.4 
France  23.1  10.1  1.0 
Italy  28.0  13.0 
Source: Tavlas (1997) Comment  - 287 
98% of exports and 88%  of imports are invoiced in dollars. For other coun- 
tries, the picture  is more mixed.  For instance,  the U.S. dollar is used  to 
invoice  more than half of Japanese exports, and about 20% of French and 
Italian exports.  Lastly, Germany is comparable  to the United  States, in- 
voicing  more than 50% of its imports in its own  currency. This last fact 
does  not fit well  with  either the PCP or the LCP assumption.  Take the 
extreme  case where  all international  transactions with  the United  States 
are invoiced  in  dollars,  at set  prices  in  the  short run. Neither  the  U.S. 
terms of trade, PF/?PH, nor the U.S. CPI responds  to nominal  exchange 
rates, and the exchange-rate  risk falls squarely  on foreigners. 
Table 2 in Friberg (2001)-reproduced  here as Table 2-provides  some 
additional  data for Sweden  for 1968 and 1995. Less than 50% of exports 
is  now  invoiced  in Swedish  krona. In contrast,  the fraction of  imports 
invoiced  in krona has increased  from 26% to 33%. 
One can conclude  that the pattern of the ECU study  has not remained 
stable over time, as more firms appear to rely on international currencies 
or  the  importing-country  currency  for  international  transactions.  One 
may legitimately  ask whether this change has been accompanied by simi- 
lar changes  in the passthrough  or associated with some of the changes in 
Table 2  CURRENCY DENOMINATION  OF SWEDISH TRADE 1995 
AND 1968 
Fraction  (%) 
Imports  Exports  Share  in 
Swedish 
Currency  1995  1968  1995  1968  exports  (%) 
SEK  33.1  25.8  43.8  66.1 
USD  21.9  22  18.4  12.3  8 
DEM  14.4  17.4  9.8  3.8  13.3 
GBP  5.4  17.3  5.4  11.2  10.2 
NLG  5.1  NA  3.2  NA  5.3 
FRF  4.1  2.5  3.7  0.8  5.1 
DKK  3  3.9  2.6  1.8  6.9 
NOK  2  2.2  2.8  0.7  8.1 
ITL  1.7  1.8  1.4  0.3  3.8 
JPY  1.7  NA  1.4  NA  2.7 
FIM  1.6  NA  1.7  NA  4.8 
CHF  1.5  NA  NA  0.5  1.9 
Other  4.3  4.7  4.6  2.5  29.9 
Total  100  100  100  100  100 
Source:  Friberg (2001). Data from 1995 are taken from the settlement  reports of Sveriges  Riksbank-all 
payments  for goods  above  a threshold  of SEK 100,000 and going  through Swedish  banks are reported. 
The data from 1968 are from Grassman (1973). Data on exports are from 1994; source: Statistics Sweden. 288  GOURINCHAS 
the  structure  and  patterns  of  international  trade  between  devel- 
oped  countries (outsourcing,  intrafirm trade, etc.), and of financial flows 
(globalization,  international  currencies,  etc.).  But  more  importantly, 
this  evidence  highlights  the  perils  of  assessing  the  merits  of  various 
monetary-policy  and  exchange-rate  regimes  if we  do  not  have  a clear 
understanding  of the determinants  of invoicing  practices. 
3.1.2 Invoicing in  Theory  At  a theoretical  level,  the  invoicing  decision 
need  not be neutral. The choice  of currency can affect the variability  of 
profits through exchange-rate risk. Consider  for instance the case where 
an exporter sets its price PH  in the importer's currency. Assume  that im- 
port demand  depends  only  upon  the import price  [Q(PH)]  and that for- 
ward  markets are available  and  efficient. The exporter can hedge  fully 
any  fluctuation  in  future  revenues  by  selling  P*Q(P*) of  the  foreign- 
currency forward. On the other hand, if a price PH  is set in the exporter's 
currency,  the  future  demand  Q(PH/?) becomes  uncertain  and  may  be 
more  difficult  to hedge.  This intuition  underlies  Friberg's (1998) result 
that invoicing  in the importer's currency maximizes  ex ante profits when 
the latter are concave  in exchange-rate  surpises. 
But  these  results  are  obtained  in  partial  equilibrium,  and  therefore 
somewhat  unsatisfactory.  After all, it is likely  that the volatility  of the 
exchange  rate will  depend  upon  the equilibrium  currency invoicing  that 
we observe. To paraphrase Krugman (1989), high exchange-rate volatility 
may be a telltale sign that exchange rates do not matter much, a situation 
that is much more likely when  prices are set in the importer's currency. 
Further, a firm's decision  to invoice in a given currency may not be inde- 
pendent  of what  other firms are doing.  Strategic complementarities  can 
be important. 
One recent paper considers the invoicing  question in a general-equilib- 
rium framework: Bacchetta and Van Wincoop  (2001). They show  that ex- 
porters have  a greater preference  to invoice  in  their own  currency  the 
higher their market share and the lower the elasticity of substitution with 
competing  products. 
It is a bit early to tell whether these results are robust, or what optimal 
monetary policy  would  be like, and how  it would  depend  upon  the de- 
gree of market incompleteness.  But this is clearly an area that deserves 
further investigation. 
3.2 BEYOND  EXPENDITURE  SWITCHING 
In moder  economies,  exchange-rate  movements  have  complex  effects 
that cannot be reduced to a simple expenditure-switching  effect. Consider Comment 289 
Devereux and Engel's (2002) careful attempt at disconnecting  the exchange 
rate from other macro fundamentals.  Under  LCP, relative  export prices 
will  not change.  Yet external adjustment will  come through  at least two 
other channels. First, a depreciation  of the domestic  currency will reduce 
markups  on foreign  goods  sold  domestically.  This decreases  profits for 
local  distributors  and/or  foreign  producers,  depending  on  the  vertical 
pricing structure of the industry. As foreign goods  become  generally less 
profitable,  one  should  expect  a gradual  improvement  over  time  in the 
external accounts. Second, an expected  depreciation leads to a compensat- 
ing  interest-rate  differential.  A  higher  domestic  interest  rate induces  a 
higher  growth  rate of consumption,  which  can also increase current net 
exports. The general message  from Devereux  and Engel's paper is that it 
takes quite a bit of work, and a number of not so appealing  assumptions, 
to disconnect  the exchange  rate. 
Given the empirical evidence  on the disconnect, i.e. of "weak feedback 
links between  the exchange  rate and the rest of the economy"  (Obstfeld 
and Rogoff, 2000), this may indicate that expenditure  switching-and  all 
the other channels-are  not very  operational. A contrario,  this reinforces 
the view  that the expenditure  effect is not so crucial anyway. 
3.2.1 Quantities and J-Curve  What does  the empirical evidence  say? One 
way to make progress is to look at the evidence  on the effect of exchange 
rates on  quantities.  After  all, it is not  enough  to measure  the  effect  of 
nominal  exchange  rate on relative prices or terms of trade. The ultimate 
importance  of expenditure  switching  can only be measured  by its effect 
on quantities: goods  imported or exported, demand for factors of produc- 
tion, etc. 
Engel correctly argues that "microeconomic  studies  that examine how 
imports  of particular types  of goods,  or how  employment  in specific in- 
dustries,  are affected by changes  in import prices must be applied  with 
a dollop  of caution.  That is because  there is a missing  link that must be 
supplied  before one can use  these  studies  to judge  the quantitative  sig- 
nificance of the expenditure-switching  effect: the degree of passthrough." 
But similarly, one should  apply caution in interpreting studies  that show 
a low  degree  of passthrough  without  looking  at the effect on quantities. 
What if import  demand  is very  elastic? Even with  a low  passthrough, 
adjustments  may be substantial. 
The first piece  of evidence  comes  from Figure 3, from Backus, Kehoe, 
and Kydland's  (1994) classic study  on the J-curve. The cross-correlation 
function between  terms of trade and the ratio of the trade balance to out- 
put  indicates  that the trade balance  tends  to improve  following  an im- 
provement  in competitiveness  (a worsening  in the terms of trade). 290-  GOURINCHAS 
Figure 3 CROSS-CORRELATION  FUNCTIONS FOR THE TRADE BALANCE 
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But these cross-correlations  do not tell us how  large is the effect of the 
exchange  rate on  the  trade balance  or factor  demands.  In Gourinchas 
(1998), I looked directly at the impact of exchange-rate movements  on the 
labor market. An important methodological  innovation  in that paper was 
to  focus  on  disaggregated  data  and  to  construct  industry-specific  ex- 
change  rates from bilateral real exchange  rates based  on  the wholesale 
price index,  using  as weights  the trade shares of the major trading part- 
ners. While  changes  in exchange  rate appear  to have  little effect at the 
aggregate  level,  they  have  important  effects  on  export-oriented  and 
import-competing  industries. Importantly for Engel's paper, these results 
do not  look  at the effect of changes  in relative  export  or import prices. 
The reason for doing  so is simple: export prices are choice variables for 
firms. Issues of simultaneity  and exogeneity  are thus likely to be impor- 
tant. On the other hand, most firms are likely to take the bilateral exchange 
rate as given and unlikely to be influenced by their individual  production 
decisions.2 
This  has  the  important  consequence  that  I  am  estimating  a  net ex- 
change-rate effect on employment,  after being filtered into import prices, 
markups, wealth and profits.3 The results, reproduced in Table 3, indicate 
that a 10% depreciation  of the exchange  rate (a high value  of A) leads to 
an increase in tradable manufacturing employment  of 0.27% over the next 
three  quarters. The  evidence  indicates  that  these  exchange-rate  move- 
ments account for between  9%  and 11%  of the fluctuations of employment 
at the four-digit level, on average. While not a major source of fluctuation, 
they  are nonetheless  significant.  Goldberg  and  Tracy (2002, 2000)  and 
Campa  and  Goldberg  (2001), in  a series  of  papers,  argue  further that 
exchange-rate  changes  also affect wages  significantly,  especially  for low- 
skill workers. 
These  results  indicate  that  exchange  rates  do  matter,  although  the 
evidence  is  not  detailed  enough  to  indicate  whether  it  is  through  an 
expenditure-switching  effect or any other channel. 
4.  What  We Cannot  Conclude  (Yet) 
With these comments  made, let me return to the second part of the paper. 
Sections  7-9  consider  three models  that can potentially  explain  the low 
2. The issue  of simultaneity  is more delicate to handle, since exchange  rates could move  in 
response  to monetary  and fiscal determinants  that affect labor markets directly. I show 
in my paper  that this is not  likely  to be a serious  issue  for the United  States: in effect, 
the paper uses  the disconnect  to identify  the response  of employment  to exchange-rate 
movements  that are not connected  with  monetary  or aggregate  activity. 
3. Since I also include  direct controls for monetary policy,  the effect of exchange  rates does 
not include  their indirect effect on domestic  interest rates. c) 
0O 
Table 3  EMPLOYMENT RESPONSE TO REAL-EXCHANGE-RATE DEVIATIONS 
Traded  n 
Two-digit  All  Exports  Import comp.  Nontraded 
Sector: 
Regressor  Timing  Coeff.  SE  Coeff.  SE  Coeff.  SE  Coeff.  SE  Coeff.  SE 
kt  Cont.  1.40  1.65  4.97  2.47  2.72  3.32  4.58  3.18  6.24  3.38 
1 lag  -0.64  2.29  5.47  3.40  2.60  4.70  8.24  4.32  -3.13  4.45 
2 lags  -0.37  1.76  -7.73  2.58  -4.28  3.49  -9.84  3.31  -0.92  3.49 
Sum:  0.39  0.76  2.71  1.13  1.03  1.38  2.96  1.03  2.18  1.88 
Et  Cont.  0.68  0.03  0.66  0.06  0.48  0.07  0.77  0.08  0.52  0.08 
1 lag  0.01  0.04  0.08  0.06  0.12  0.08  0.03  0.08  0.02  0.08 
2 lags  0.17  0.03  0.28  0.05  0.37  0.07  0.18  0.07  0.06  0.07 
Sum:  0.85  0.04  1.02  0.07  0.98  0.10  0.98  0.10  0.60  0.10 
it  Cont.  0.05  0.03  0.05  0.05  0.18  0.07  -0.08  0.07  -0.03  0.07 
1 lag  -0.12  0.03  -0.05  0.06  -0.10  0.08  0.01  0.08  -0.06  0.08 
2 lags  0.02  0.03  0.01  0.06  -0.07  0.07  0.04  0.08  0.07  0.07 
Sum:  -0.06  0.02  0.01  0.03  0.01  0.05  -0.03  0.04  -0.01  0.04 
Source:  Gourinchas  (1998, Table 3). Comment  *  293 
passthrough  to consumer prices, together with higher passthrough  to im- 
port prices and a significant  expenditure-switching  effect. Among  these 
models,  Engel argues that the shipping  costs and the nontradable compo- 
nent of tradable goods  are not the full answer. I want to revisit his argu- 
ments  and offer a few  comments. 
4.1 SHIPPING  COSTS  AND DISCONNECT 
Shipping  costs reduce the weight  on foreign goods  in the CPI, and if do- 
mestic  and foreign  goods  are substitute,  this lowers  the passthrough  to 
consumer  prices. To measure  the importance  of the shipping-cost  argu- 
ment, Engel runs regressions of the volatility of the bilateral real exchange 
rates for food and for commodities  less food against a measure of distance 
and the volatility  of the nominal exchange rate. Distance proxies for ship- 
ping  costs, as is traditional in the gravity-equation  literature. When both 
variables are introduced  in the regression, only the volatility  of the nomi- 
nal exchange  rate comes  in significantly,  which  the author interprets as 
a rejection of the shipping-cost  theory. 
Yet it is  possible  to interpret the  results  somewhat  differently.  High 
volatility  of  the nominal  exchange  rate could  also be  evidence  of large 
transaction or shipping  costs,  as in Dumas  (1992). In that model,  devia- 
tions from LOOP reflect the presence of nonconvex  adjustment costs. The 
larger the costs,  the larger the zone  of inaction. The argument  does  not 
require that prices be set in the currency of the importer. 
In other words,  we  would  expect more variability in the nominal  and 
real exchange  rates if shipping  costs  are higher.  The endogenous  vari- 
ance  of the nominal  exchange  rate implies  that regressions  reported  in 
Table 1 of the paper do not allow  a separation between  the shipping  cost 
theory  and  the LCP alternative. The volatility  of the nominal  exchange 
rate may be picking up those components  of the costs that are not already 
captured by geographical  distance. 
One may be tempted to dummy exchange-rate regimes. After all, Mussa 
(1986) showed  that there is  much  less  nominal  and  real exchange-rate 
variability under fixed than under flexible exchange  rates. However,  this 
may fail for another reason: if indeed differences in shipping costs account 
for the difference in volatility,  it is the long-run volatility  that matters. A 
rigid  fixed-exchange-rate  regime  may  suffer  an ignominious  fate-and 
the ensuing  bout of volatility-if  the peg does not allow for adjustments 
in real exchange  rates. Though in the short run volatility  may be low,  in 
the long  run it may be substantially  higher. 
More generally, nominal-exchange-rate  volatility  is likely to reflect the 
volatility of the underlying  monetary policy as well as the impediments  to 
trade in goods  and the degree of price stickiness. An alternative approach 294  GOURINCHAS 
would  directly use  measures  of the volatility  of the nonsystematic  part 
of monetary policy-since  the systematic part may also be geared to offset 
exchange-rate  fluctuations,  as in the case of fixed exchange  rates. 
As  they  stand,  the empirical  results  from Section  7 do not provide  a 
tight case that shipping  costs are not an important part of the explanation. 
4.2 NONTRADABLES  AND LOCAL  DISTRIBUTION  COSTS 
The  paper  argues  that nontradables  are relatively  unimportant  in  ex- 
plaining  deviations  from LOOP. Denote by p* the foreign-currency price 
(in logs)  of a good  sold  in the foreign  country. If the good  is produced 
at home,  the price of exports in home  currency is e +  p*. As a matter of 
decomposition,  we  can write 
e + p  =  mc(z, y*, e) +  g(x*, e), 
where  mc(z, y*, e) represents  the marginal  cost in domestic  currency of 
production  and distribution, and depends  upon  the domestic  input  costs 
z, as well  as the foreign local costs y* and the exchange  rate e. The term 
g(x*, e) represents  the markup and depends  upon  foreign demand  x* as 
well  as the exchange  rate e, if the firm is pricing to market. We observe 
that the exchange  rate appears both in the marginal-cost term, reflecting 
the importance  of the local nontradable  component,  and in the markup, 
reflecting pricing to market. 
Similarly, let's write the price of the good  in the source country as 
p =  mc(z, y, 1) +  ,i(x, 1), 
where both the marginal cost and the markup depend only upon domestic 
factors, as emphasized  by the 1 in both terms. The marginal costs differ 
to the extent that the distribution  part differs as well.  The relative price 
of the good  is simply 
e  +  p* -  p  =  [mc(z,  y*, e)  -  mc(z,  y,  1)]  +  [,(x*,  e)  -  g(x,  1)].  (1) 
This expression  contains two  terms. The first one reflects the differences 
in marginal costs, expressed in a common currency. One can think of this 
term as measuring  the importance of local costs. The second term reflects 
the fact that firms can price-discriminate  and apply different markups to 
different countries. The exchange  rate appears in both terms. 
Equation (1) is what  Goldberg  and Verboven  (2001) estimate  in their 
study  of the European  car market. They first estimate  a semistructural Comment - 295 
demand  system and use it to derive own- and cross-price derivatives  that 
determine the optimal price markups. They then estimate a supply system 
similar to equation  (1). They use their estimate  to derive  the relative im- 
portance  of the exchange-rate  component  for the marginal  cost and for 
the markup term. Their results indicate that roughly  2/3 of the deviations 
from LOOP arise from the local cost component. 
By contrast, Engel writes the price of the good in the foreign market as 
p  =  a p* +  (1 -  a)p*, 
where  p* represents  the  price  of  the  local-nontradable-components 
and p* the price of the tradable part. a represents the (constant) share of 
the costs arising from the local cost component. Using this decomposition, 
he obtains the following  expression  for the relative price: 
e + p* -  p  [(p  -  *) -  (Ps -  p)] +  [e + p  -  ]  (2) 
1-a 
The first term represents  the  domestic-vs.-foreign  relative  price  of  ser- 
vices, or more generally the nontradable component.  Engel interprets this 
term as capturing the local cost component.  The second  term represents 
the relative  price of the tradable component.  Under  the PTM, it should 
be zero. Engel interprets this term as capturing the relative markup. 
Using  data on the relative price of services as a proxy for ps and p*, and 
data on the price  of food  and nonfood  commodities  as a proxy  for the 
price of the tradable component,  Engel concludes  that most of the varia- 
tion arises from deviations  in the (unobserved)  relative price of the trada- 
ble component,  e + p* -  p. In other words,  there is little evidence  in the 
OECD sectoral price data that deviations  from LOOP arise from the for- 
eign vs. domestic  price of services  relative to tradable goods. 
Should  we  conclude  that local costs  are unimportant,  and unaffected 
by exchange  rates, as the paper does? 
At  face value,  this paper's  approach  has  a number  of  advantages:  it 
relies  on  a simple  decomposition,  and  does  not  require the potentially 
costly  auxiliary assumptions  on the market structure or the shape of the 
demand  system  that Goldberg  and  Verboven  must  make.  However,  it 
is  also  unclear  that one  can map  equation  (2) simply  into  equation  (1). 
Ultimately,  it is equation  (1) that we  are interested  in, and equation  (2) 
may have  little to say about it. 
Consider the following  counterexample.  Suppose  there is perfect com- 
petition both at home and abroad, so that g(x*, e) =  i(x, 1) = 0. All varia- 296  GOURINCHAS 
tions in the relative price must come from the local cost component  and 
relative marginal costs. Assume  further that input prices are constant in 
their own currency. If there is substitution between local and home inputs, 
and  marginal  costs  are not  constant,  a fluctuation  in the exchange  rate 
will  affect the price of the tradable component  less or more than one for 
one, leading to a fluctuation in e + p* -  p. Yet, by construction, this would 
simply  reflect the effect of the exchange  rate on relative  marginal  costs 
mc(z, y*, e) -  mc(z, y, 1). It would  be incorrect to attribute the variation 
to markup fluctuations. 
5. Conclusions  and Suggestions 
This is a stimulating  paper written by  an expert in the field.  It asks an 
important question,  one that has gathered substantial attention of late: Is 
there an expenditure-switching  effect, and if so, through which channels? 
In so doing,  it provides  a very  valuable  and insightful  survey  of recent 
developments  on new  open  economy  macro models.  It then offers some 
new empirical evidence  aimed at discriminating amongst the recent mod- 
els that feature both low  passthrough  at the consumer  level  and higher 
passthrough  at the import level.  I find that part of the paper somewhat 
less convincing.  The empirical evidence  is exciting and will undoubtedly 
provoke  further rounds. But I do not think that it addresses  squarely the 
empirical questions raised by the models. The field has matured consider- 
ably in the past few years, and I believe  it is now  ripe for a careful look 
at the  sort of microeconomic  evidence  that will  deliver  the next  set  of 
stylized  facts. I am quite certain that Engel will be among the major con- 
tributors to this endeavor. 
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Discussion 
Alan Stockman remarked that the literature tends to focus on the details 
of price stickiness and price setting, and pays less attention to the conse- 
quences  for quantities. He felt that micro-level  work on this issue would 
be  interesting,  though  it should  not  violate  the  Flood-Rose  disconnect 
puzzle.  He suggested  that the disconnect  puzzle  may be connected  with 
the fact that a fraction of trade is intrafirm trade, which  involves  transfer 
pricing for tax purposes.  This implies  that many prices do not have any 
economic content. He also questioned whether prices matter for quantities 
when trade takes place under implicit long-term contracts between  firms. 
He noted  that in his work  on J-curves, he had  found  that in the longer 
term, the J-curve exists,  but  that it  does  not  have  the  standard  conse- 
quences  for  GDP.  Rather  than  exchange-rate  depreciation  leading  to 
higher net exports and an increase in GDP, depreciation leads to a statisti- 
cally significant  decrease  in GDP. 
Ken Rogoff noted that Engel's work provides  strong evidence  that con- 
sumer  prices  don't  respond  to  exchange-rate  changes.  He  added  that 
Goldberg and Knetter show that passthrough  is much greater into whole- 
sale  prices,  but  that recent work  by  Giovanni  Olivei  shows  that pass- 
through into wholesale  prices has declined  both in the developed  world 
and in the developing  world.  He commented  that this is a mystery,  and 
suggested  that it might be connected  with  the fact that intrafirm trade is 
growing  as a share of total trade. He pointed  out that intrafirm trade is 
now  over  50% of trade for many  countries.  He  also  cited  work  by Jim 
Rauch showing  that interfirm trade often takes place as part of a network. 
However,  he remarked that while the importance of intrafirm trade might 
suggest  how  exchange-rate  risk is shared, how  firms react to exchange- 
rate changes is still a puzzle.  He noted that some firms, such as Ikea, seem 
to be good  at matching  sourcing behavior  to exchange-rate changes, but 
that expenditure  switching  on a large scale doesn't  seem  to result. 
Ariel  Burstein  mentioned  that  in  exploring  the  links  between  pass- 
through and expenditure switching, it might be instructive to look at large 
devaluations,  where nominal  rigidities  are unlikely  to play a major role. 
He noted  that in work where he looked  at nine large devaluations  in the 
1990s, import prices move  closely  with  the exchange  rate, but consumer 
prices do not. 
Charles  Engel noted  that the  international  setting  demonstrates  that 
menu  costs cannot be the only explanation  for nominal  price stickiness, 
as menu  costs  are incurred no  matter which  currency prices  are set in. 
Following up on this point, Ken Rogoff remarked that this literature could Discussion  *  299 
be very useful for closed-economy  macroeconomics.  He said that interna- 
tional data confirm what  Kimball, Barro, and Hall said in relation to the 
closed  economy:  Wage stickiness  is not enough; prices also have  to be a 
bit sticky. 
Lars Svensson was troubled by the fact that the currency in which firms 
set prices  is taken as exogenous  in the paper,  and asked  Charles Engel 
whether he had considered  endogenizing  this choice. On a related point, 
Bob Hall  pointed  out  that in many  cases,  particularly  in intermediate- 
product  markets, pricing  is not the unilateral decision  of the seller, but 
the result of an interaction between  buyer  and seller. He suggested  that 
the literature should  take this into account. 
Lars Svensson  also  asked  whether  there  is  evidence  of  different  re- 
sponses  of prices  to transitory and permanent  changes  to the exchange 
rate, and suggested  that VAR evidence might be informative on this point. 
Engel  replied  that  the  evidence  suggests  that  the  behavior  of  real ex- 
change rates and deviations  from the law of one price is remarkably simi- 
lar at short and long  horizons.  On this point,  Alan Stockman remarked 
that work  on the differences  across countries  in the extent of exchange- 
rate passthrough  would  be desirable.  He agreed with  Karen Lewis  that 
cross-country  differences could be due to differences across industries in 
passthrough  and differences  across countries  in industrial  composition. 
However,  he  noted  that the  implications  for expenditure  switching  do 
not depend  on where  cross-country heterogeneity  in passthrough  comes 
from. 
Charles  Engel  summed  up  the  thrust  of  his  paper  as  a rejection of 
the  simple  Devereux-Engel  zero-expenditure-switching  local-currency- 
pricing  approach.  He  noted  that the  evidence  favors  considerable  con- 
sumer  price  stickiness,  except  in  high-inflation  emerging  markets  as 
mentioned  by Ariel Burstein. But it also favors considerable passthrough 
to import prices, and he saw  the determination  of the resulting  magni- 
tude  of expenditure  switching  as the next challenge  for the literature. 